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ABSTRACT 
 
In the early 1990s many scientists claimed that there was a scientific 
consensus that the anthropogenic production of greenhouse gases was causing 
global warming. Carbon dioxide is produced in far greater quantities than other 
greenhouse gases. Over 80 percent of the carbon dioxide produced in the United 
States comes from coal-fired power plants. If global warming is a threat to the 
welfare and survival of future generations, the United States, as one of the 
greatest producers of greenhouse gases, has an obligation to reduce its 
production of these gases. 
In order to determine the most effective way to reduce the production of 
greenhouse gases in the United States, this study examines recent efforts by the 
Clinton and Obama administrations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from 
coal-fired power plants. The Clinton and Obama administrations were selected 
for this study because both administrations were Democratic, and both had 
avowed political agendas to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. For the first two 
years each administration enjoyed the support of Democratic majorities in both 
Houses of Congress, and they had similar political support for the remainder of 
their time in office. 
This study will show that President Obama’s executive approach to 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants has been more 
effective than the legislative approach of the Clinton administration. The study will 
indicate that a scientific consensus about anthropogenic global warming and the 
political will to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power plants did  
                                                                                                                    
iv 
not exist during the 1990s. The study also shows that, despite the effectiveness 
of the Obama administration in reducing carbon dioxide emissions, there are 
many problems with the executive approach to the problem. The study suggests 
that the Clean Air Act has ceded to much legislative power to the Executive 
branch of government, and that success in reducing carbon dioxide emissions 
from coal-fired power plants is too dependent on the will of the Executive. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND 
 
Introduction 
In the fall of 1991, Donald Crane et al., wrote that, “Virtual unanimity 
exists among scientists that anthropogenic releases of greenhouse gases 
are forcing greenhouse warming even though there are uncertainties on 
magnitude and rate of increase.”1 From the beginning of the 1990’s until the 
present day, most environmental scientists have agreed that manmade 
greenhouse gas emissions released into the atmosphere are causing 
global warming.2  If it is true that the anthropogenic production of 
greenhouse gas emissions is harming the environment and putting the 
survival of current and future generations at risk, the United States has an 
obligation to reduce its prolific production of such emissions.3 On June 12, 
1992, the George H. W. Bush administration signed the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which the United 
States Senate ratified on October 15th of that same year.4 In an Earth Day 
speech on April 21, 1993, President William Clinton committed the United 
States to reducing anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions to their 1990 
levels.5 Thus, the United States established an international obligation to 
reduce its production of greenhouse gases when the UNFCCC was 
entered into force on March 21, 1994.6 Since this commitment was 
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established, the United States has struggled to achieve this goal. 
In order to determine the most efficient method to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions from the United States, this study will examine 
two recent efforts to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired 
electric power plants. The first effort to be examined is the Clinton 
administration’s legislative approach. The second effort to be examined is 
President Barack Obama’s executive order approach. 
 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
The regulation of carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired power 
plants should be examined for a number of reasons. According to the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) executive summary of the 
“Inventory of U. S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2011,” total 
greenhouse gas emissions rose from 6183.3 million metric tons of CO2 
equivalent (Tg CO2 Eq.) in the year 1990 to 6702.3 Tg CO2 Eq. in 2011.7 
This is an increase of 519.0 Tg CO2 Eq., or 8.4 percent, in total greenhouse 
gas emissions over the twenty-one year period. Of the 6702.3 Tg CO2 Eq. of 
greenhouse gas emissions that occurred in 2011, 5612.9 Tg CO2 Eq., or 
83.7 percent, of those emissions were carbon dioxide.8 Of the total carbon 
dioxide emitted in 2011, 5277.2 Tg CO2 Eq., or 94 percent, came from the 
combustion of fossil fuels, and 2158.2 Tg CO2 Eq., or 38 percent, came from 
electricity generation.9 Carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired power 
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plants were 1820.8 Tg CO2 Eq. in 1990. Therefore, carbon dioxide 
emissions from the generation of electricity have increased 18.5 percent 
over the same twenty-one year time span.10 This increase in carbon dioxide 
emissions from electricity generators powered by fossil fuels constitutes 65 
percent of the total increase in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 to 
2011. In 2013, the EPA’s “Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions” reports 
that coal combustion is responsible for 80 percent of the carbon dioxide 
produced by electricity generation.11 Hence, coal-fired power plants 
produced 1726.6 million metric tons of carbon dioxide in 2011, and coal-fired 
power plants produced 52 percent of the total increase in greenhouse gas 
emissions from 1990 to 2011.  If the United States plans to reduce its total 
emissions of greenhouse gases, it must reduce its total emissions of carbon 
dioxide. If the U. S. is to reduce total carbon dioxide emissions, it must stop 
the increase in carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants. While 
carbon dioxide at 83.7 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions is the 
most ubiquitous of the greenhouse gas emissions, Methane at 8.76 percent, 
nitrous oxide at 5.32 percent, hydroflourocarbons at 1.92 percent, 
perflourohydrocarbons at 1.00 percent, and sulfur hexafluoride at .14 
percent comprise 16.24 percent or 1089 Tg CO2 Eq. of all greenhouse gas 
emissions produced in the United States.12 The EPA reported that stationary 
sources of greenhouse gas emissions produced 6.3 Tg CO2 Eq., or 1.0 
percent, of CH4 emissions and 22.0 Tg CO2 Eq., or 6.0 percent, of nitrous 
4  
oxide emissions in 2011.13 Coal-fired power plants contribute only a fraction 
of the methane and nitrous oxide emissions produced by stationary sources. 
Therefore, carbon dioxide emissions are the most compelling reason to 
regulate coal-fired power plants for greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Control Methodology 
The Clinton and Obama administrations were chosen for this study 
because both administrations had proposed political agendas to reduce the 
emissions of greenhouse gases. Each had similar political party support, 
congressional control, and both entered office during an economic recovery. 
According to the American Presidency Project (APP), in the 1992 
presidential campaign, Clinton’s Democratic Party Platform stated that, “The 
United States must become a leader, not an impediment, in the fight against 
global warming.”14 In the 2008 presidential campaign, Obama’s Democratic 
Party Platform declared that, “Global climate change is the planet’s greatest 
threat and our response will determine the very future of life on this earth.”15 
The research design for this study controls for political partisanship in that 
President Clinton and President Obama are members of the Democratic 
Party. Both the Clinton and the Obama administrations entered into their 
first terms of office with Democratic majorities in the United States House of 
Representatives and the United States Senate. From January 1993 to 
January 1995, the Democratic Party enjoyed an advantage in the 103rd U.S. 
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House of Representatives of 258 Democratic representatives to 176 
Republicans representatives. In the 103rd United States Senate, the party 
enjoyed a majority of 57 Democratic senators to 46 Republican senators.16 
From January 2009 to January 2011, the Obama administration was 
supported in the 111th House by a majority of 256 Democratic 
representatives to 178 Republican representatives, and the Democrats led 
the 111th Senate with 51 senators compared to 47 Republican senators.17 In 
the 104th U. S. Congress, the Clinton administration lost support of 
Democratic majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, 
and the Republicans retained these majorities in both houses of the 105th 
and 106th Congresses of Clinton’s second term.18 The Obama 
administration lost the support of a Democratic majority in the House of 
Representatives of the 112th Congress, but he was supported by a 
Democratic majority in the Senate.19 The Republicans retained a majority in 
the 113th House of Representatives while Democrats controlled the 113th 
Senate. 20 
An examination of the Clinton administration will reveal that  
little will existed among the people of the United States or the U. S. 
Congress to make the economic sacrifices required to reduce man-
made greenhouse gas emissions. It will show that at the beginning of 
his first term, President Clinton proposed an energy tax to reduce the 
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production of anthropogenic greenhouse gases that was later 
defeated in Congress. Further attempts to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions were modest, voluntary, and not legislative. Thus, man-
made greenhouse gas emissions increased over the eight years that 
Clinton was in office. Therefore, Clinton’s minimal legislative efforts 
to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions were 
unsuccessful. Global warming theory and the dangers of man-made 
greenhouse gases had been studied from the end of World War II 
until the time President Clinton took office. Scientific research 
organizations, funded by the United States government, publicized 
these dangers at the national and international and levels. Hence, 
the dangers were known to the general public. Why was there no 
commitment by the American people, the Congress, and the Clinton 
administration to reduce greenhouse gases from sources such as 
coal-fired power plants? It seems that there are two major reasons 
why the greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power plants 
problem was not addressed in the 1990s. 
First, despite Donald Crane’s claim that there was “virtual unanimity 
among scientists”21 that man-made greenhouse gas emissions caused 
global warming, no such unanimity of scientific opinion existed at that time. 
There was a political consensus among many scientists in government 
funded research programs that advanced global warming research in 
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support of government environmental policy. However, reputable scientists 
on both sides disputed most aspects of global warming science. The 
government funding of global warming research politicized the science of 
global warming. The government tended to fund research that supported 
policy decisions. Thus, the science of anthropogenic global warming 
became a political issue and the scientific consensus became one political 
position among many. 
Second, the dangers of coal-fired power plant emissions were known 
since the late 1960s. It was also known that coal-fired power plants 
produced enormous amounts of carbon dioxide. Provisions of the Clean Air 
Act Amendment of 1970 were designed to reduce emissions from coal-fired 
power plants and other large stationary sources. Yet, from the enactment of 
the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1970 until the Clinton presidency, the use 
of coal in power plants increased steadily. The Clean Air Act Amendment of 
1970 provided for the regulation and reduction of dangerous emissions from 
coal-fired power plants, but the emissions of air pollutants from stationary 
sources was secondary to energy policy. The Clinton administration’s failure 
to reduce such emissions was a continuance of the policies of the previous 
twenty years. An examination of the development of anthropogenic global 
warming theory and the use of coal in the latter part of the twentieth century 
will illustrate that no consensus among scientists existed at the beginning of 
the Clinton administration and that the reduction of coal emissions was 
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secondary to national energy policy. 
9  
CHAPTER TWO 
A LEGISLATIVE APPROACH 
 
The Clinton Administration 
In his State of the Union Address on February 17, 1993 President 
Clinton proposed a broad based tax that would tax the heat produced by 
all forms of energy.22 Robert Paarlburg writes that: 
 
Clinton had decided that Congress would never enact a pure carbon 
tax because it would hit the coal producing and the coal using states, 
especially in the Mid-West, too hard. Consequently, he decided to 
propose a tax (based on British thermal units or Btus) on all forms of 
energy production including nuclear power, hydroelectric power, and 
even windmills, whether these industries produced greenhouse gases 
or not. By placing surcharges on energy generated by fossil fuel 
sources such as coal and petroleum, Clinton included some 
environmental content to appease committed environmentalists.23 
 
 
In an Earth Day speech on April 21, 1993 President Clinton committed the 
United States to reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the 
year 2000.24 In June of 1993, President Clinton’s Btu tax was killed in the 
Senate Finance Committee by Democratic Senator David Boren of 
Oklahoma.25 Eleven Democrats and nine Republicans served on the 
committee.26 As all the Republicans on the committee opposed the Btu tax, 
any Democrat on the committee had the power to stop the proposed tax.27 
Senator Boren wanted the Btu Tax out because he wanted more spending 
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cuts than tax increases; therefore, he used his position on the committee to 
eliminate the tax from the budget.28 Even with a Democratic majority in both 
houses of Congress, President Clinton’s first attempt at environmental 
legislation failed, and his commitment to meet 1990 greenhouse gas 
emissions levels was severely undermined. According to Paarlburg, 
“Technically the modest reduction Clinton committed the country to would 
have been easy to achieve had he managed to secure congressional support 
for a broad based energy tax in 1993.”29 At this point President Clinton did 
not move to increase regulatory control. When he released his Climate 
Change Action Plan in October of 1993 he stated, “The package of mostly 
voluntary initiatives aims to avert the threat of global warming through 
‘American ingenuity’ … not more bureaucracy or regulation.”30 Some 
reviewers of the plan indicated that its emphasis on flexibility and  
cooperation, rather than control and mandates, attended to the economy 
as much as the environment.31 The plan called for voluntary initiatives that 
would reduce U.S. emissions by 109 million tons by the year 2000.32 The 
plan would cost 1.9 billion dollars in government spending and 60 billion 
dollars in voluntary spending from business and industry.33 It consisted of 
three partnerships between government, business, and industry and was 
designed to increase energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse emissions. 
The Climate Challenge partnership was arranged between the Department 
of Energy (DOE) and major electric utilities. Eighty investor owned utilities 
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and hundreds of public utilities expressed an interest in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions.34 Climate Wise was an effort between the 
DOE, the EPA, and industry that pledged to restrict  emissions in cost 
effective ways.35 The Motor Challenge was an agreement between the 
DOE, motor-systems manufactures, industry motor users, and utilities to 
install efficient motors in industrial applications.36 These voluntary 
programs would apply to electric utilities to a greater or lesser degree and 
would impact coal-fired power plants. However, by 1995, the political 
community recognized that the Clinton administration was not going to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. 
In March of 1995, Under Secretary of State Timothy Wirth announced 
that the United States remained 30 percent short of reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions to 1990 levels.37 Brad Knickerbocker quotes World Watch 
Institute senior researcher, Hillary French, “Independent evaluations indicate 
that most of the climate plans issued so far (by the U.S. and other nations) 
will do relatively little to slow greenhouse gas emissions … This is because 
they consist mainly of modest voluntary policies.”38 Others blamed Congress 
as Knickerbocker suggests, writing that, “Shortly after he was elected, 
President Clinton pushed for a special tax on carbon-based energy sources 
like coal and oil in order to reduce their use. But congress nixed that idea, 
and some lawmakers are pushing to cut federal programs for renewable 
energy and climate research. The House cut NOAA’s climate change 
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research budget by 40 percent.”39 In 1997, a draft appraisal by the National 
Resources Defense Council asserted that the 189 MMTCE shortfall in 
emissions reductions was due to a combination of a 40 percent reduction by 
Congress of funds requested by the President, greater than expected 
economic growth, and lower energy prices.40 President Clinton’s initial 
attempt at a legislative reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by taxing 
coal and oil failed. In 1994, ten out of eleven environmental bills failed to 
pass.41 According to Los Angeles Times columnists William Eaton and 
Michael Ross, the economy was the number one issue for the Democratic 
majority of the 103rd Congress. There was no will in Congress or among the 
American people to fund the reduction of greenhouse gases. As the Los 
Angeles Times reported on the opening day of the 103rd Congress, 
“Legislators plan to address a spectrum of issues that includes jobs, health 
care, ethics and fetal tissue research. Topping the list, however, is the 
economy— the issue a majority of voters identified as the most important as 
they cast their votes two months ago.”42 The reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions took a subordinate position to the economy, and Congress was 
cutting funding for environmental projects. The Clinton administration turned 
to the voluntary programs that failed to meet the acknowledged goals of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. If there was “virtual unanimity among 
scientists” that the anthropogenic release of greenhouse gases was causing 
global warming and that global warming was a threat to mankind, why did a 
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Democratic administration and a Democratic majority in Congress fail 
to make the commitment to reduce man-made greenhouse gases?43  
The failure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions during the Clinton 
Administration likely resulted from a change in the relationship between 
government and the scientific research community after World War II. 
From the early 1950s, government funding was used to force the 
development of scientific research into anthropogenic global warming. In 
an effort to fill the information and technology gap about air pollution and 
control technology, the government institutionalized the change between 
government and the research community by appropriating vast sums of 
money through the Clean Air Act and subsequent amendments. During 
the development of its air pollution and anthropogenic global warming 
control policies, the U.S. government adopted a policy of using the best 
available scientific information and technology. It was at this point that 
government policy changed from funding scientific research to provide 
information on which to base environmental policy, to funding that would 
provide the best available scientific information and technology to carry 
out government environmental policy. For the most part, the use of best 
available information was an inadequate foundation on which to base 
policy. This created a situation in which scientist competed for government 
funding based on their ability to provide research that supported current 
policy. 
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As the scientific community and government policymakers became 
more closely linked, government policy and scientific research became 
more politicized. The politicization of anthropogenic global warming science 
resulted in a political consensus about global warming science and 
government policy by government funded scientists. While a political 
consensus existed among many scientists with regard to anthropogenic 
global warming, many reputable scientists with valid objections contested 
these theories. Because the government supported the political consensus 
among scientists, the valid objections raised by other scientists were 
ignored. Hence, the science of anthropogenic global warming became a 
political issue rather than a scientific issue. By the beginning of the Clinton 
administration this political issue divided policymakers, the American 
people, and the scientific community. Thus, establishing the political 
will to regulate CO2 from coal-fired power plants lacked support from both 
the scientific and political communities. As a practical matter, there was 
nothing new in the failure of the Clinton administration to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired electric utilities. From the height 
of the environmental movement in 1970, to 1990, the effort to reduce 
emissions of air pollutants from coal-fired power plants took a back seat to 
the energy needs of the United States. The following sections will address 
the politicization of anthropogenic global warming science and U.S. energy 
policy that made the reduction of CO2 emissions from coal-fired power 
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plants politically problematic during the Clinton administration. 
 
Anthropogenic Global Warming Theory 
The modern theory of global warming had its origins in the scientific 
advances of scientific research during World War II. According to Corfee-
Morlot et al.: 
 
In large part, the advances came in the pursuit of military interest – 
either in the use of weather modification as a strategic weapon of 
geopolitical warfare or the need to understand the diffusion of 
potentially destructive agents – e.g. chemicals and nuclear radiation 
– in the atmosphere and marine environments. Likewise, scientific 
advances in understanding the radiative properties of CO2 in the 
atmosphere and the oceans role in the removal of atmospheric CO2 
were developed by the military during World War II.44  
 
 
The writers also note that in utilizing these wartime advances, “Three 
scientists were notable in their efforts: Swiss scientist Hans Suess and two 
American scientists Roger Revelle and Charles Keeling, with Revelle 
becoming a main research entrepreneur out of Scripps Institute in La Jolla, 
California.”45 The emergence of the contemporary theory began when 
Hans Suess demonstrated that the oceans were acting as a vast sink for 
atmospheric carbon dioxide and that the concentration of carbon dioxide in 
the atmosphere was increasing.46 In 1955, Dr. Suess joined with Dr. Roger 
Revelle to show that the exchange of carbon dioxide between the 
atmosphere and the ocean was limited, and this caused concern about the 
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possibility of “never-before-seen amounts” of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere.47 In the late 1950s, Revelle hired Charles Keeling to measure 
carbon dioxide concentrations in Antarctica and Mauna Loa, Hawaii.48  
These measurements documented an increasing trend in atmospheric 
carbon dioxide concentration, and they have been one of the major focal 
points of the global warming debate since 1958.49 Theories that an 
increased carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere was causing 
climate change were rejuvenated in 1956 when Gilbert Plass published a 
paper indicating that global mean temperature could increase by 1.1º C per 
century. In 1959, he updated his calculations to 3º C per century, and 
concluded that increasing the concentration of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere would absorb more infrared radiation causing the atmosphere to 
warm.50 The newly developed science of anthropogenic global warming was 
accompanied and supported by the new technology of computer science. 
From its inception the science of global warming was linked with the 
use of computers and climate modeling. Corfee-Morlot et al. state that, 
“Research originally focused on war-time possibilities for weather 
modification and John von Newman, at Geophysical Fluid Dynamics 
Laboratory (GFDL) in Chicago was the main research entrepreneur in this 
area.”51 With the development of computers in the 1950s and in the 1960s, a 
community of scientists began to model the circulation of the atmosphere 
which supported the theory of global warming.52 Allen Hammond reported 
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that, “Numerical modeling of the weather has always been intimately 
involved with electronic computers. Among the earliest applications of the 
modern computer built at the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study and 
completed in the early 1950s—was the problem of weather prediction.”53 
Although many problems existed with computer modeling, the success of 
early numerical experiments led to an early linkage between computer 
modeling and weather forecasting. Hammond explained that, “Despite the 
use of a very simplified atmospheric model, these early attempts—John von 
Neumann and Jule Charney—proved so successful that operational use of 
the technique for weather forecasting began in early 1954.”54 Advances in 
computer science cemented the link between global warming science and 
climate modeling. Corfee-Morlot et al. explain that: 
 
Atmospheric modeling was built upon the rapid increases in 
computing power in this period, which increased several 
thousand fold from the1950s into the mid-1970s. Emerging 
‘general circulation modeling (GCM) tools provided initial results 
relevant to climate change published in the mid-1960s. Although 
the models ignored many important factors, the crude general 
circulation modeling exercise corroborated Plass’ conclusion that 
global warming would accompany human induced increases in 
CO2; and by the end of the 1960s, this modeling community 
had confirmed the usefulness of this tool for global warming 
research.55 
 
 
           Government funding began to politicize anthropogenic global           
warming theory as the contemporary theory was published in Suess’ and 
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Revelle’s 1957 work. Corfee-Morlot et al. state that: 
 
In a period dominated by policy for science the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) was created in 1950. In 1957/1958 with the 
leadership of Roger Revelle, the World Meteorological Organization 
worked with other governmental organizations to support the 
International Geophysical Year; this significantly boosted funding and 
attention to climate change science, even prior to official recognition 
of climate change as a political or social issue, within a broader 
programme focused on meteorological issues.56  
 
 
In the early 1960s, the theory of global warming continued to develop 
as a science and a political issue. Corfee-Morlot et al. asserted that, “The 
1960s ushered in a range of scientific results to confirm the greenhouse 
effect or global warming theory as well as the beginning of broad-scale 
interaction between scientific   and   policy   communities   on   this   
issue.”57    On   the   subject   of anthropogenic g loba l  warming, Sheldon 
Ungar reported that,  “In  1963  the Conservation Foundation sponsored a 
meeting on the topic, while in 1965 a report of the President’s Science 
Advisory Committee contained the first recognition in a government 
document that human activities could produce climatic change.”58 Though 
carbon dioxide was not considered a pollutant at the time, the Air Quality 
Act of 1967 did recognize the problem by asserting the need for research 
regarding carbon dioxide emissions.  The Senate Committee on Public 
Works held hearings on the Air Quality Act of 1967 and “the immediate 
need’ to develop methods to control emissions of sulfur compounds, oxides 
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of nitrogen, carbon monoxide, and carbon dioxide.”59 The science of global 
warming became more of a political concern for the international 
community as the international role of the WMO expanded in 1967. Corfee-
Morlot et al. declared  that,  “Shortly  after, in 1967, the International Council 
of Science (ICSU) and WMO created a collaborative international research  
programme on global atmosphere, which included climate change along 
with weather prediction.”60  The authors proclaimed, “Finally, government- 
sponsored analysis of the science began to emerge, linking the rise in 
CO2 and global warming to fossil fuel use and receiving separate attention 
in government budgets.”61 Thus, by the end of the 1960s the politicization of 
global warming science through government funding was pervasive, and the 
empirical evidence and scientific conclusions of scientific research were 
interpreted in terms of social and political objectives. As Corfee-Morlot et 
al. stated, “From the end of the 1960s, the fundamental nature of the 
scientific endeavor on climate change issues become more intertwined 
with the public sphere. Agrawala explains this transition as a shift away from 
policy for science to science for policy. In this transition, the science and 
the politics of the issue become closely intertwined and affect one 
another.”62 Government funding was not the only policy that was to have a 
political effect on the environmental sciences. 
           In 1968, the Senate Committee on Public Works held hearings on 
the 1967 Clean Air Act. In these hearings, a policy was put forward that 
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appears to have created much of the scientific and political disagreement 
that has surrounded the science of air pollution control and the science of 
global warming. Prior  to  hearings  in  1968,  a  Senate  subcommittee  
issued  a  report  which proposed a solution to the problem of inadequate 
scientific information and technology respecting the creation air pollution  
control policy. Martin & Symington reported that, “A subcommittee staff report 
on air quality criteria issued in July 1968 in advance of the hearings, while 
anticipating this problem, also pointed out that regulation should not await 
the development of adequate scientific data, but must proceed on the 
best evidence available.”63  In July of 1968, the Subcommittee on Air and 
Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works began a series 
of hearings about expert testimony regarding the use of best evidence 
available. The authors stated that, “The one certain thing established by the 
expert testimony is that even the best available evidence may be totally 
insufficient to form the basis for the kind of scientific conclusion on which  
one would expect  broad  regulation  in  this  field  to  rest.”64 While this 
prehearing recommendation was eventually implemented, it was not without 
its critics. The authors write of the above recommendation, “While that 
conclusion is the  subject  of  considerable  dispute,  since  there  are  those  
who  believe  that absent adequate scientific data, the effort may move in 
erroneous directions, and while the issuance of the various criteria is 
uncertain, undoubtedly some criteria will be issued in early 1969.”65 As 
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the information of global warming science became more widely dispersed 
many scientists began to evaluate the science of global warming. 
          In 1970 Helmut Landsberg asked the question, “How much has CO2 
increased as a result of burning fossil fuels?"66 He responded to the 
question by stating that, “It is quite difficult to ascertain even the mean 
amount of CO2 in the surface layers of the atmosphere, especially near   
vegetation. Various agriculturist have reported concentrations ranging from 
210 to 500 parts per million.”67 Daily amplitudes of carbon dioxide 
concentrations during growing season are about 70 parts per million.68  
Thus, as Landsberg stated, “Nearly all early measurements were made in 
environments where fluctuations took place. This, together with the lack of 
precision of measurements, means our baseline—atmospheric CO2  
concentrations prior to the spectacular rise in fossil fuel consumption of 
this century—is very shaky.”69 The author advised that the ocean further 
complicated the estimation of atmospheric CO2, writing that: 
 
The  oceans  are  a  major  sink  for  CO2. The equilibrium with 
t h e  bicarbonates dissolved in seawater determines the amount of 
CO2 in the atmosphere. In t h e  exchange between atmosphere and 
ocean, the temperature of surface water enters as a factor. More 
CO2 is absorbed at lower surface water temperatures than at higher 
temperatures. I have already pointed out the fact that surface-water 
temperatures fluctuate over long or short intervals; most of these ups 
and downs are governed by wind conditions. The interchange of the 
cold deep water and the warm surface water through downward 
mixing and upwelling, in itself an exceedingly irregular  process,  
controls  therefore,  much  of  the  CO2   exchange.  … Hence, it is 
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quite difficult to make long-range estimates of how much atmospheric 
CO2 will disappear in the Oceanic sink.70 
 
 
Landsberg also suggested that, “Even the remaining question of how 
much the earth’s temperature will change with a sharp increase of the CO2 
content of the atmosphere cannot be unambiguously answered.”71 This is 
because, “The answer depends on other variables such as atmospheric 
humidity and cloudiness.”72 According to Landsberg, a remaining difficulty 
in determining CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere is that, “. . . our 
estimates of CO2 production by natural causes, such as volcanic exhalations 
and organic decay, are very inaccurate; hence the ratio of these natural  
effects to anthropogenic effects remains to be established.73  Landsberg’s 
article indicates that this lack of  credible observational data will complicate 
the development of computer generated atmospheric models, and the 
expanding role of general circulation modeling in global warming research 
for decades to come. Not only is the science of global warming questioned, 
but so is the science of computer modeling of the climate. 
Allen Hammond reported that, by 1971, the complexity of atmospheric 
models used by the National Meteorological Center for the U. S. National 
Weather Service, the Navy, and the Air Force had greatly increased, 
but the most elaborate models were those developed at the Geophysical 
Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL) in Princeton, New Jersey and the 
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National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) in Boulder, Colorado.74   
Hammond noted the scale of the models, writing “The enormous scale of 
these models is indicated by the time required to process them with the 
current computers—from a few hours to most of a day, with the largest 
models to calculate a 24-hour forecast.”75 Regardless of the increased 
complexity of computational atmospheric models and their broad use by 
meteorologists and climatologists, there were many problems involved with 
their use. Hammond stated that, “The consensus among most 
meteorologists seems to be that present research models provide some 
information about the weather for at least five days in advance, but that 
accurate long-range forecast for even this period are still not possible.”76   He 
indicated that the limited ability of computer models to accurately forecast 
the weather was due to factors in addition to the inadequate observational 
data that Landsberg indicated. Hammond declared that it was unclear why 
computer models did not more accurately forecast future weather patterns, 
stating: 
 
Nor is it clear whether the limiting factor is (i) the quantity and quality 
of observational data needed as input to the model (ii) the 
computational grid that is used (and that could be made still smaller 
when faster computers are  available)  or  (iii)  the  representation  of  
physical  processes  in  the models. Numerical experiments are being 
conducted to examine each of these possibilities, but meteorologists 
agree that much more extensive observational data will be necessary 
to adequately test the models. Meteorologists are planning a global 
experiment with a target date of 1976 to obtain this data on a 
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worldwide basis and to test the requirements for future international 
observing networks as part of the Global Atmospheric Research 
Program (GARP).77 
 
 
 
Some of the problems with the collection of a sufficient amount of 
credible observational data could only be solved through investment in 
observational research and the development of a reliable database over 
time. The problem of reducing the computational grid depended on the 
steadily increasing capacity of computers to perform more calculations in 
less time.  However, the remaining problem was different. The problem of 
accurately representing natural events in computational models was 
inherent to numerical experimentation. Hammond explained the problem as 
follows: 
 
But a crucial feature in climatic simulation is the way in which the 
various physical processes that control the addition of energy to the 
atmosphere are modeled. Knowledge of these processes is still 
incomplete—the research details of heat and moisture transport at 
the air-sea interface, for example, are subject to ongoing research. 
Other important climatic influences, such as the extent of ice and 
snow cover at each pole, are poorly understood; for these reasons 
meteorologists believe that it is not possible to do definitive numerical 
experiments.78 
 
 
The author indicated that the representation of natural physical processes in 
computer   models was even more complicated when he asserted that, 
“Smagarinsky believes that the development of still better atmospheric 
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models for both weather prediction and climate simulation depends on 
finding more accurate methods of representing the cumulative effects of 
physical processes too small to include explicitly in the models; 
‘progress’ as he put it,   means dealing more cleverly with small scale 
processes.”79    Hammond informed his readers that, “In numerical 
experiments designed to simulate the climatic conditions, models are 
integrated until they reach equilibrium—a process that takes about a year 
(on the simulated time scale) for models that include the stratosphere.”80 
There was also an inherent problem with the integration of 
computational climatic models, as Hammond indicated: 
 
Meteorologists believe that the atmosphere is, in principle, a 
deterministic system. But because of the nonlinear character of 
atmospheric dynamics and the instabilities inherent in atmospheric 
processes, small errors— whether introduced by observational 
limitations or by finite difference approximations that are used in 
numerical models—are known to grow as integration of the model 
proceeds. Hence, the effects of even small errors will eventually 
influence the large-scale features of any model atmosphere.81 
 
 
The fact that the ocean and the atmosphere are so closely intertwined 
presents a further problem with the integration of numerical models. 
Hammond explained: 
 
But owing to greater heat capacity and the resultant thermal inertia of 
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the oceans, the oceanic model requires several hundred years to 
come to equilibrium, compared with about 1 year for the atmospheric 
model. The atmospheric model, on the other hand, is much more 
complicated and requires approximately 40 times more computation 
than does the oceanic model for an equivalent time step. And in the 
experiments, the joint model did not attain equilibrium.82 
 
 
Despite the quantity and complexity of the problems that limit the forecasting 
ability of computational atmospheric models, Hammond asserted that they 
have an advantage in that, “Observational experiments in the atmosphere 
are costly and logistically complicated. By comparison numerical 
experiments with computers are much easier to carry out.”83 
          The problems put forward by Helmut Landsberg and Allen Hammond 
with regard to anthropogenic global warming and the use of computer 
generated climate models were problems that persisted throughout the 
rest of the 1970s, 1980s, and into the 1990s. With regard to general 
circulation models, Hammond reported in 1974, “Other efforts are directed to 
constructing general circulation models of the oceans—a problem that is 
still far from resolution—which could then be coupled with the atmospheric 
models.”84 Of other modeling problems, he stated that, “Still other 
researchers have focused on finding better ways to model the effects  of 
phenomena,  such  as  cumulus  clouds,  which  are  too  small  to appear 
explicitly in a general circulation model.”85 In a 1976 article published by 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science, a group of 
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scientists (including J. E. Hansen whose congressional testimony in 1988 
elevated the anthropogenic global warming issue to one of national urgency) 
evaluated the state of computerized climate modeling. Its authors asserted 
that, “Climate modeling is at a primitive stage and is not capable of 
reproducing inter annual and long term climate variations.”86 According to 
the authors, this “primary difficulty” arises because, “The processes, 
involving the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere, and land surface, are 
particularly complex because of the significant interactions and feedback 
effects that occur among them over climatic time scales.”87 In the late 1970s, 
J. T. Houghton expressed the concerns of many scientists about computer 
modeling and the state of environmental research. He wrote in 1979, 
“However, it must be pointed out that although these models include 
many relevant physical processes, there are some very fundamental 
feedback mechanisms … which are not included and for which there are, as 
yet, no adequate means available for their inclusion.”88 
          The problems of anthropogenic global warming and climate modeling 
science were complicated by other scientific revelations in the 1970s. In the 
January/February edition of Environment, deforestation was added to the list 
of problems affecting CO2 concentrations and climate change. The author 
explained that the Director of the Eco-systems Center of the Marine 
Biological Laboratory at Woods Hole, Dr. Woodwell, believed that 
worldwide deforestation is contributing as much carbon dioxide to the 
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atmosphere as the combustion of fossil fuels. If the oxidation of humus is 
included, Dr. Woodwell believes that the carbon dioxide contribution of 
deforestation is greater than that of fossil fuel combustion.89  The author 
qualifies this statement by adding that, “The issue is not a clear cut one, 
however, since the amount of CO2 accumulating in the atmosphere is, 
according to Dr. Woodwell, substantially less than would be expected given 
the amount released from the burning of fossil fuels and from the destruction 
of forest and other elements of biomass.”90 
          Another issue that complicated global warming theory in the 1970s 
was global cooling. Corfee-Morlot et al. write that, “Given the decline in 
GMT from 1940 to 1970, some scientists believed a cooling effect of 
particles was outweighing the warming effect of CO2 and there was on going 
disagreement between cooling and warming advocates.”91 They explained 
that, “Even as late as 1980, in part due to the cooling trend shown in 
GMT data over the period 1940-1970, conventional wisdom as reported in 
government science-based reports was that cooling would be as likely as 
warming.92 As climate change research continued the theory of global 
cooling gave way to the theory of global warming. The authors state that, 
“The intense drive to understand past climate change  eventually,  led  to  
developments  in  the  1980s  that  began  to  dispel theories about global 
cooling in favor of warming.”93 Regardless of this lack of agreement among 
scientists, government funded groups continued to push for policies to 
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counter global warming. 
Research on the greenhouse effect and global warming continued 
through the 1970s, and scientists and scientific organizations funded by the 
United States government incorporated political agendas into their scientific 
programs. In February of 1978, Science News reported that: 
 
When in Washington, do as the politicians do. And, that’s just 
what a good many scientist did last week when 5000 of them 
gathered for the annual meeting of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science. Even though the theme of the meeting was 
‘Science and Technology:  New  Tools,  New  Dimensions,’  many  
of  those  present seemed more interested in arguing social-political 
questions than presenting and listening to hard science.94 
 
 
The author wrote of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science’s (AAAS) political agenda, stating, “As in previous years, the AAAS 
showed its willingness to take a stand. This year the association stood 
up for the Equal Rights Amendment.”95 The AAAS also released a twenty-
five year forecast based on a consensus derived from a government study 
introduced at the group’s annual meeting. Science News reported that, 
“Few climatologists agree on the weather for the next six months, let alone 
the next 25 years. But according to a study by the National Defense 
University in Washington D.C., released at the AAAS meeting, the likelihood 
of a catastrophic climate change is small. Most likely, the climate until the 
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year 2000 will be very similar to that of the last 30 years, with more 
possibility of global warming than cooling.96 Science News stated that: 
 
 
William R. Gasser of the U.S. Department of Agriculture presented 
the first part of the study that will attempt to quantify and estimate the 
likelihood of various climatic changes, estimate their effect on crop 
yields, and evaluate policy implications. ‘We’re not forecasting, but 
putting quantitative bounds on climate,’ Gasser said, ‘It is a survey of 
opinion to allow decisions to be made on the best judgments 
available at the time.”97 
 
 
The study was an international opinion survey of scientists from various 
parts of the world. It was reported that: 
 
The findings of the study, called ‘Climate Change to the Year 
2000’ are based on a survey of 24 climatologist in seven countries. 
From their answers to questions about perceived global temperature 
changes, five climate scenarios, ranging from large cooling (0.3° to 
1.2° C cooler than the early 1970s) to large warming (0.6° to 1.8° 
warmer), were defined and assigned a probability of occurrence. 
Depending on their perceptions of global temperature trends, each 
respondent was associated with a particular climate scenario, such as 
latitudinal distribution of temperature changes, length and variability 
of the growing season, amount of precipitation and frequency of 
droughts and monsoon failures, were drawn and assigned 
probabilities.98 
 
Gasser’s report on the study was ambiguous. While he reported that there 
was no consensus on any issue, he explained that the warming effect of 
carbon dioxide appears well established.99 
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In  the  latter  part  of  the  1970s  other  scientific  research  
organizations predicted the dire consequences that would result from human 
activities that cause global warming. Lamb and Morth wrote of a statement 
that was issued in response to concerns about Man’s effect on the climate 
that said: 
 
In 1976 the World Meteorological Organization issued a statement 
that suggested that a drastic warming of world climates from this 
cause (especially Man’s production of carbon dioxide) must be 
expected to set in before the end of the century, and might already 
have begun, leading ultimately to disappearance of the Arctic ice, 
melting of ice caps, rise of sea level and great shifts in natural 
vegetation and crop belts.100 
 
 
Barrie Pittock reported that, “Within the United States, DOE has been the 
lead agency in coordinating and financing a research program on the 
greenhouse effect following a major scientific conference held at Miami 
Beach, Florida, in 1977.”101 Despite the deficiencies of scientific data and 
the inadequacies of computer generated climate models, Sheldon Ungar 
declared that, “The issue reached a new stage in 1979: A report to the 
Council on Environmental Quality cast the greenhouse effect as a policy 
issue, the Department of Energy set up an interdisciplinary CO2  research 
program, the National Academy of Sciences studied the problem, and the 
first World Climate Conference urged all nations to address the threat.”102 In 
1980, Dennis Hayes stated that, “A 1979 report by the National Academy 
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of Sciences states: ‘We now have incontrovertible evidence that the 
atmosphere is changing and we ourselves are contributing to that change 
….”
103
 
In  1980,  Madden  and  Ramanathan  wrote,  “The  inherent  
variability  of climate will make detection of changes due to increasing CO2  
difficult.”104  They indicated that the reason for this problem was: 
 
 
The observed interannual variability of temperature at 60° N has been 
investigated. The results indicate that the surface warming due to 
increased carbon dioxide which is predicted by three-dimensional 
climate models should be detectable now. It is not, possibly because 
the predicted warming is being delayed more than a decade by ocean 
thermal inertia, or because there is a compensating cooling due to 
other factors. Further consideration of the uncertainties in model 
predictions and of likely delays introduced by ocean thermal inertia 
extends the range of time for the detection of warming, if it occurs, to 
the year 2000.105 
 
 
James Hansen et al. wrote of the status of computer modeling in the 1980s, 
stating, “Models do not accurately simulate many parts of the climate 
system, especially the oceans, clouds, polar sea ice, and ice sheets.”106 The 
writers asserted that, “The main uncertainties in the climate model—that is, 
its tuning knobs—are (i) the equilibrium sensibility and (ii) the rate of heat 
exchange with the ocean below the mixed layer.”107 Hansen et al. explained 
that the way to correct the climate model is by adjusting the tuning knobs 
(the equilibrium sensibility and the heat exchange with the ocean below the 
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mixed layer) to agree with the observed temperature. They claimed that, 
“The general correlation of radiative forcing with global temperatures 
suggests that model uncertainties be constrained by requiring agreement 
with the observed temperature trend.”108 It is difficult to understand how 
forcing uncertain data to agree with observed data that may be 
p r o b l e m a t i c  (in a  n u m e r i c a l  s i m u l a t i o n  b a s e d  o n  
s t a t i s t i c a l  correlation rather than causality) can be predictive of real 
world phenomenon. 
A  1986  article  in  the  periodical  Environment  Jill Jager stated 
that, “observed increase in the concentration of atmospheric carbon 
dioxide in the past century has been caused by carbon dioxide emissions 
from fossil fuel combustion ….109 She wrote of the climate changes resulting 
from increased greenhouse gas emissions, stating, “. . . since reliable 
estimates of regional-scale climatic changes as a result of greenhouse gas 
increases are presently unavailable, it is not possible to predict the direction, 
magnitude, or rate of future change in ecosystems with a degree of 
confidence sufficient for policy formation or strategy choice.”110  William 
Nitze confirmed Jager’s statement when he asserted that, “There are many 
uncertainties about the magnitude, timing, and regional distribution of future 
climate change, but we do know that atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases are increasing.”111     Even with the uncertainties about 
climate change, Nitze explained that, “To focus attention on these 
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questions, in 1987, the U. S. government urged the governing bodies of 
the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment 
Programme to establish an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) to consider climate change at the policy level.”112  When the IPCC 
met in November of 1988, a policy reminiscent of the U.S.’s 1968 Clean 
Air Act policy was instituted. The author stated that: 
 
In his remarks to the IPCC in November, Fred Berenthal, U. S. 
Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, explained that a detailed and 
complete scientific assessment of global climate change ‘will take 
years perhaps decades, to develop.’ He went on to argue, however, 
that the panel should begin to study potential response strategies 
before the science assessment is completed. Some may argue that 
no analysis of possible response strategies should be initiated until 
we fully understand the dynamics of climate change, and we respect 
that opinion,’ he concluded, ‘but prudence dictates that we begin now 
to consider the practicality and potential effectiveness of various 
response options.’113 
 
 
Dale Jamison wrote that in that same year, “The emerging consensus about 
climate change was brought home to the American public on June 23, 1988, 
a sweltering day in Washington D. C., in the middle of a severe national 
drought, when James Hansen testified to the U.S. Committee on Energy and 
Natural Resources that it was 99% probable that global warming had 
begun.”114    A number of scientists responded to Hansen’s congressional 
testimony as Joel Scheraga indicated, writing, “Results of statistical test 
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done by Andrew Solow of Woods Hole Oceanographic contradict Hansen’s 
claim that an anthropogenically induced global warming trend has been 
detected. And Tim P. Barnett, an oceanographer  at  Scripps  Institution  
of  Oceanography,  has  stated,  ‘The variability of climate from decade to 
decade is monstrous. To say that we’ve seen the greenhouse signal is 
ridiculous.”115 Eric Barron asserted that, “After studying the air and water 
dynamics of the tropical Pacific, Kevin E. Trenberth and Grant W. 
Branstator of the National Center for Atmospheric Research, in Boulder, 
Colorado, and Phillip A. Arkin, of the National Ocean and Atmospheric 
Administration blamed the weather of 1988 on ‘natural variations’ in 
circulation patterns.”116    William Nitze explained of atmospheric CO2  that, 
“We also know that such increases, in theory, lead to global and 
worldwide changes in climate. However, we do not yet have a clear signal 
of a warming trend because the variations we have observed so far could be 
within the range of natural and historic variability.”117 
In 1992, author S. Fred Singer wrote of a 1990 plan by the  
International Panel on Climate Change to avert a temperature rise of 5° C 
in the next century: 
 
An Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), sponsored 
by the United Nations, has been laying the groundwork for an 
international convention aimed at averting such a climate 
catastrophe. Its scientific base is a ‘Policymakers Summary’ on 
greenhouse warming, released in June 1990, said to represent a 
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‘scientific consensus.’ Far from it. The summary ignores valid 
scientific objections to theoretical calculations that predict global 
warming. It is silent about other human activities, notably the 
emission of sulfur dioxide in industrial processes that are thought to 
promote climate cooling. It plays fast and loose with historical data 
that clearly disagree with the standard greenhouse warming theory. It 
also puts a ‘spin’ on its major conclusions that can only serve to 
mislead the nonscientific decision makers who are earnestly seeking 
answers to global problems.118 
 
 
Singer also asserted that, “The IPCC report is based on faith in existing 
mathematical models that have not been able to ‘hind cast’ the temperature 
changes experienced in the last century, and furthermore have been in a 
state of flux.”119 He declared that the reason for this was that, “Many 
scientists do not accept IPCC conclusions and call attention to the fact that 
the strongest temperature increase occurred before the major rise in 
greenhouse gas concentration.”120 Singer also asserted that, “Serious 
discrepancies also exist between model results and actual experience from 
the detailed climate record of the past century.”121  
Just as the IPCC was releasing its “Policymakers Summary” 
representing the scientific consensus on global warming, Christopher J. 
Ecsedy and Charles G. Murphy published an article explaining that, “A 
consensus that the causes of climate warming observed during the past 
century remain unclear was reached at a session of the Intergovernmental 
Committee on Climate Change Working Group I held in February 1990 in 
Great Britain.”122 They further supported Singer’s assertions, writing: 
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On the basis of computer models clear signs of the 
greenhouse effect should have appeared as a consequence of 
increases of greenhouse gases in the last 100 years. However, 
model predictions were contradicted by the climate record in nearly 
every important aspect, including that the Northern Hemisphere has 
not warmed more than the Southern Hemisphere, high latitudes 
have not warmed more than low latitudes, and the U. S. has not 
shown a predicted warming trend.123 
 
 
A consensus about global warming and the greenhouse effect did not truly 
exist in the early 1990s. While the political consensus among scientists may 
present a powerful argument for government policies to prevent 
anthropogenic global warming, the contrary arguments suggests just as 
powerfully that the United States and the international community were 
forcing the use of inadequate scientific information to solve the problem. 
Writer Sheldon Ungar stated of the political realities of the anthropogenic 
global warming issue, “So much uncertainty surrounds the scientific 
climatological facts that political inaction and counter claims suggesting 
warming will be trivial enjoy plenty of scope.”124 The lack of scientific 
consensus about global warming science and mathematical climate models 
have created a political issue rather than scientific agreement about 
solutions to global warming problems.  Since the very beginnings of the 
modern theories of global warming and the greenhouse effect, government 
forced global warming research has politicized the issue and made 
scientific research subject to political division rather than scientific 
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cooperation. Thus, scientists became political activists for, or against, the 
government’s global warming policy, and global warming theory became the 
subject of political debate rather than of scientific agreement. 
In order to reduce manmade emissions of CO2 in the United States, 
the Clinton administration needed to get the electric utilities to reduce their 
emissions of CO2. Though coal-fired power plants were recognized as a 
major source of numerous air pollutants, compliance to the Clean Air Act 
took a back seat to government energy policy. Thus, it would seem that the 
production of energy, as a political issue, outweighed fears of environmental 
disaster proposed by government funded scientific organizations. 
 
Energy Policy and Coal-Fired Power Plants 
As the U.S. Government established standards for the reduction of 
sulfur oxides and other pollutants emitted from coal-fired electric utilities, it 
continued to support the use of coal to generate electricity. According to 
writer Harry Perry, the overall use of coal to meet the energy requirements 
of the United States “. . . declined steadily until by 1972 it provided 17.3 
percent, with oil and gas providing most of the balance.”125 Although the 
Clean Air Act Amendment of 1970 had been instituted with provisions to 
reduce emissions from stationary sources, they were not the primary focus 
of the law. John Graham explained that, “The most prominent issues at the 
time were emissions-control deadlines for the automobile industry and, to a 
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lesser extent, new source performance standards for stationary sources of 
air pollution.”126 Within two years of the enactment of the Clean Air Act 
Amendment of 1970, the government opted to increase the use of coal to 
produce electricity. This resulted from the increased prices of natural gas 
and oil caused by the 1973 oil embargo initiated by the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Perry explained that: 
 
The quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-1974 and the fear of even 
further sharp price rises (which actually occurred in 1979) raised 
additional concerns about the long term implications of higher energy 
cost. Thus, for both security and cost considerations, energy policy-
makers turned to the reserve of domestic coal, which could be 
supplied at low cost, as a possible means of providing solutions to 
those newly developed energy problems.”127 
 
The increased use of coal to generate electricity was the major 
change that resulted from the oil embargo. Perry claimed that, “There are 
several reasons for this change. Government initiatives were designed to 
increase coal use and price induced switching to coal occurred whenever 
possible.”128 The Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act 
(ESECA) of 1974 was just one of the initiatives used to increase the use of 
coal to generate electricity. Author John Christie reported that in January of 
1975, President Ford called for, “. . . amending the Clean Air Act and the 
Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974 in order to 
promote the increased use of domestic coal.”129 The ESECA also extended 
the authority of the Federal Energy Administration to convert oil and gas 
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fired power plants to coal.130 Gregory Elmes and Trevor Harris explained 
that, “The National Coal Policy Act of 1978, the Power Plant and Industrial 
Fuels Act of 1978, and the Energy Tax Act of 1978 increased coal’s share 
in the energy market ….”131 Hans Landsberg informed his readers that the 
Fuel Use Act of 1978 prohibited the construction of power plants and large-
scale industrial facilities that would burn oil and natural gas, and this Act 
was not repealed until 1987.132 These policies encouraged the use of coal 
to produce electricity, as Perry asserted, writing, “In the United States a 
number of policy initiatives were undertaken to increase coal use and by 
1982 coal’s share of the U.S. energy supply was 22.1 percent having risen 
slightly from a low in 1972 of 17.3 percent.” 133 This modest increase in the 
percentage of the energy supply was accompanied by an increase in the 
overall energy supply of approximately 5000 quadrillion Btus during the 
same time period; approximately 3000 quadrillion Btus of this increase was 
from coal combustion.134  
Policies that encouraged the use of coal were not the only problem 
that affected the control of emissions from coal-fired power plants as Perry 
asserted, stating, “The unanswered technical questions, the complexity of 
chemical processes occurring after emission and before disposition, and the 
lack of a good data base from which to assess reliably the magnitude of the 
problem, including the health problem, have left considerable doubt about 
the rationale of regulatory standards.”135 Inadequate science is not the only 
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problem with controlling emissions as Perry wrote, explaining, “In addition to 
uncertainties in the scientific information, the formulation of air pollution 
regulations has been erratic and based on policy approaches that have not 
solved the problem and have required frequent modification in time tables 
established to achieve stated emission level.”136 Standards for the regulation 
of carbon dioxide emissions were not established under the Clean Air Act 
Amendment of 1970 or subsequent amendments. The major emphasis at 
that time was the control of sulfur emissions and other pollutants. Writer 
Harry Perry declared that, “In the direct combustion of coal, air pollution 
standards must be met for sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and particulates. 
Other pollutants are receiving attention, but standards do not yet exist.”137 
Coal fired power plants were recognized as the major source of sulfur in the 
atmosphere. Alan Schlottman wrote, “In the United States coal-fired power 
plants generate the major portion of sulfur emissions, accounting for most, of 
the 57 percent of emissions attributable to electric utilities.”138 While the 
regulation of carbon dioxide did not come under the authority of the Clean 
Air Act until 2009, many of the same problems that affected the regulation of 
other pollutants would affect the regulation of carbon dioxide. Although the 
need to reduce emissions from coal-fired power plants was apparent, the 
use of coal to generate electricity continued to increase into the 1980s. 
In 1979 the Iranian Revolution interrupted oil and gas supplies from 
the Middle East, and the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island caused 
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public opinion in the United States to question the safety of nuclear power. 
These events solidified the electric utilities choice of coal as the preferred 
fuel for electricity generation. Scientist Bruce Allar stated: 
 
In recent years coal has returned to the front burner as the future fuel 
source considered most promising by the electric power industry. This 
has happened for two reasons, first, the other fossil fuels traditionally 
used in utility boilers---oil and natural gas---are less plentiful in the 
United States and are therefore subject to the same vagaries of 
foreign domination that led to the 1970s Arab oil embargo, second, in 
the aftermath of Three Mile Island concern over the safety and 
economics of nuclear power weakened the prospects that it will be 
the principle source of energy in the coming decades.139 
 
 
An economic recession in 1980 slowed the increase in electricity production 
from 1979 to 1981; however, this strengthened coals position with respect 
to its status as the chosen fuel for electricity generation.140 Perry wrote, 
“Since electric power generation, which is heavily coal based, was less 
effected than other fuel uses by the economic recession and conservation 
effort, coals share of the market was less effected than other fuels.”141 
Therefore, he explained, “Although electricity production grew an average of 
only 1 percent between 1979 and 1981, coal use by the electric utility 
industry grew by about 6 percent a year during that period” 142 According to 
Hans Landsberg, coal’s share of the nation’s energy supply reached 23.5 
percent in 1986 and, had “. . . virtually become a satellite of electric 
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power.”143 Authors Donald Strait and Richard Ayers wrote in 1987 that,  
“Despite the 17-year history of the Clean Air Act, certain chemical 
operations, oil refinery processes, and other important industrial sources of 
smog-causing pollution remain unregulated in most states.”144 The 
increased use of coal to generate electricity continued to the end of the 
1980s and into the 1990s. 
Writers Elmes and Harris asserted that, “In 1990, the electric utility-
industry accounted for 86 percent of domestic coal consumption while 
industrial plants accounted for less the 14 percent.”145 From the passage of 
the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1970 to the passage of the Clean Air Act 
Amendment of 1990, electricity generation increased by approximately 
1,368,000 million kilowatt hours or by approximately 89 percent.146 During 
the same time period electricity generated from coal increased by 889,617 
million kilowatt hours or by approximately 126 percent.147 Thus, 
approximately 65 percent of the increase in net electrical generation from 
1970 to 1990 was fueled by coal combustion. In 1970 the electric power 
sector consumed 61 percent of the coal consumed in the United States.148 In 
1990 it was responsible for the consumption of approximately 86.5 percent 
of coal used in the United States. There were 462,400 thousand short tons 
more coal consumed by the electric power sector in 1990 than in 1970.149 
This was an increase of approximately 145 percent in the consumption of 
coal by the electric power utilities over the twenty year period. The overall 
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consumption of coal in the United States increased by 381,300 thousand 
short tons. This was an approximate increase of 73 percent more coal 
consumed by the United States in 1990 than in 1970. Thus, the consumption 
of coal by the electric power companies accounted for 121 percent of the 
total increase in coal consumption from 1970 to 1990. This indicates that 
coal use by the electric power companies drove the increase coal 
consumption, while other industries diminished their use of coal. The steady 
increase of coal use from 1970 to 1990 represents a steady increase of 
carbon dioxide emissions over that time period. If the Clinton Administration 
was to meet its 1993 commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 
1990 levels, it would have to secure the reduction of CO2 emissions from the 
electric utilities. 
Although the groundwork for the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions had been laid by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, the 
regulation of carbon dioxide emissions was not yet under the authority of the 
Clean Air Act. Donald Crane et al. explained that, “Other portions of the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 address toxic emissions from coal-fired 
plants and set the stage for considering CO2 emissions by initiating data 
collection.”150 Therefore, at the beginning of the Clinton administration, no 
provisions in the law existed to regulate CO2 emissions. Clinton’s legislative 
attempt to control emissions of CO2 took the form of a tax on the production 
of energy. Clinton’s energy tax was defeated in committee by a single 
45  
Democratic senator aligned with a solidified Republican opposition that 
favored spending cuts to increasing taxes. However, given the history of 
energy use over the preceding twenty years and the fact that the economy 
was the primary concern at the time, it is unlikely that the Btu tax would have 
ever received the required support to become law. Clinton’s response to this 
defeat was a somewhat lackluster attempt to persuade polluting industries to 
voluntarily spend 60 billion dollars to reduce greenhouse gas emission. It 
seems unlikely that the utility companies (who had been converting to coal 
because it was the cheapest fuel available) would have voluntarily spent 
billions of dollars to reduce emissions. Robert Paarlburg wrote of Clinton’s 
Climate Change Action Plan that, “His official composite climate change 
policy, the Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) produced in October, 1993, 
did not revive the energy tax proposal and included no new international 
negotiation initiatives. It did not even tighten corporate average fuel 
economy standards for automobiles, despite Clinton’s earlier campaign 
pledge to try to do so.”151 Despite the Democratic majorities, in both houses 
of Congress, the 1994 Congress failed to pass ten out eleven environmental 
initiatives. After 1994, Republican majorities controlled Congress throughout 
the remainder of Clinton’s time in office. Rather than making the commitment 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, both Democratic and Republican 
majorities in Congress preferred to nurture the economy. It seems obvious 
that the scientific consensus about urgency of anthropogenic global warming 
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failed to convince either Democrats or Republicans to act to reduce 
greenhouse gases. Congress cut environmental programs and funding, and 
the Clinton administration seemed to except the early defeat of its 
environmental policies with little resolve to revive them. 
According to the EPA’s Inventory of U. S. Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2011, CO2 emissions in 1992 totaled 4962.5 
million metric tons. By the end of the Clinton’s second term, CO2 emissions 
totaled 5,678.0 million metric tons, an increase of 715.5 million metric tons or 
an approximate increase of 14 percent over President Clinton’s term. The 
Clinton administration’s legislative approach to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions from coal-fired power plants was minimal and unsuccessful. It 
demonstrated either a lack of commitment to address the problem or a lack 
of understanding about how to address the problem. Although President 
Clinton issued 364 executive orders during his time in office, he refused to 
use bureaucracy and regulation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from 
coal fired power plants. This indicates that President Clinton was not 
convinced of the necessity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions during his 
administration. Ronald Brunner and Robert Klein wrote of Clinton’s Action 
Plan that, “First, the Action Plan is not expected to achieve its goal of 
returning U. S. greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 
2000, or even coming close. It could turn out to be little more than a 
symbolic substitute for effective action.”152 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EXECUTIVE APPROACH 
 
The Obama Administration 
President Obama pursued legislation to control greenhouse gas 
emissions as both a Senator and as a President. Jonathan Adler recalled 
that, “Specifically, then-Senator Obama called for reducing by 2050 
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States by 80% through the 
imposition of a cap and trade regime.”153 Cap and trade is a market-based 
program that progressively limits emissions overtime. Allowances totaling the 
limitation cap may be traded or purchased to enable businesses to meet 
goals established under the cap. This provides an incentive and means for 
polluters to bring their emissions within established limits.154 On May 5, 
2009, Representative Henry Waxman introduced House Resolution 2454, 
the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, which included the 
President’s proposed cap and trade policy.155 On June 26, 2009, the House 
of Representatives passed House Resolution 2454 by a 219 to 212 vote. 
The Senate then received the bill on July 6, 2009.156 Prominent Senators 
such as Barbara Boxer, John Kerry, Joe Lieberman, Lindsey Graham, and 
others, began working on proposals for a Senate environmental bill. Yet, 
House Resolution 2454 remained in the Senate until the summer of 2010. 
Despite overwhelming Democratic majorities in both houses of the 111th 
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Congress, H. R. 2454 barely passed in the House. The Senate never 
brought the bill to a vote.157 Just as the Democratic majority in the 103rd 
Senate did not deliver on President Clinton’s legislative agenda to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions with a Btu tax, the Democratic majority in the 
111th Senate did not approve President Obama’s cap and trade proposal to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Like President Clinton, President Obama 
faced a Republican controlled House of Representatives after the midterm 
election. However, President Obama was not threatened with budget cuts to 
his administrative departments and agencies. He was able to fund much of 
his environmental program through the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009. 
Unlike the Clinton administration, the Obama administration engaged 
in an aggressive regulatory program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
from coal- burning power plants. These regulations make new coal-fired 
power plants more expensive to construct and operate while existing plants 
face expensive new standards. As one expert observed, “. . . the U.S 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA; Washington, D.C.) is moving to 
regulate coal-fired power plants even more, not only with respect to 
greenhouse gas, but also with respect to cooling water, and the disposal of 
coal-combustion residuals.”158 Some projects to construct new coal fired 
power plants and modernize older plants have been cancelled since 
2008.159 New coal fired power plants, and older plants undergoing 
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modifications are regulated under the Clean Air Act (CAA) as stationary 
sources of greenhouse gas emissions. The regulation of greenhouse gas 
emissions under the CAA came about as a result of a 1999 coalition 
between a number of state governments and environmental interest groups. 
They joined forces to petition the EPA to control greenhouse gas emissions 
from motor vehicles under Section 202 of the CAA.160 In 2003, the EPA 
denied the petition on the grounds that it lacked the authority to regulate 
greenhouse gases as pollutants under the CAA.161 The EPA’s reasoning 
was that the CAA was written to control more conventional pollutants such 
as particulates and smog, not globally dispersed emissions such as carbon 
dioxide.162 In the 2007 Supreme Court case, Massachusetts v. EPA, the 
Court decided, in a five to four vote, that the EPA had the authority to 
regulate greenhouse gas as pollutants under the CAA.163 Once the 
Supreme Court decided that greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles 
were pollutants, the CAA allowed for their regulation if the EPA 
Administrator determined that these pollutants posed a danger to the 
public.164 
On December 15, 2009, the EPA made a formal finding that new 
motor vehicles produced greenhouse gas emissions that caused or 
contributed to air pollution that posed a danger to public health and 
welfare.165 Once a finding of endangerment was made, the CAA requires 
that standards to regulate such pollutants be established by the EPA.166 
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Other provisions of the Act contain the same endangerment language.167 
The determination that greenhouse gases were dangerous under Section 
202 of the CAA triggered their regulation from new and modified stationary 
sources under Section 111.168 Thus, the regulation of greenhouse gas 
emissions from coal-fired power plants was recognized as a danger to 
public health and welfare, and carbon dioxide was officially recognized 
as a harmful pollutant. Another significant effect of the endangerment finding 
was the CAA requirement for New Source Review and Title V permitting.169 
The regulation of coal-fired powered plants and other stationary sources of 
greenhouse gas pollutants is separated into technologically-based standards 
and emissions-based standards. Technologically-based standards require 
certain kinds of emission control technology, and emission-based standards 
designate the maximum concentrations of pollutants in the atmosphere that 
protect public health. These standards are provided under Sections 108 and 
109 of the CAA and are known as the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS).170 
Section 111 of the CAA is the primary provision for the technological 
standards known as the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS).171 
NSPS require that “new or modified” major sources of greenhouse gases 
obtain permits that mandate technological standards.172  A source is 
considered major if it emits 100 tons per year (tpy) or 250 tpy depending on 
the source category.173 Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permits 
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impose site-specific technology-based requirements that call for the case-
by-case application of the best available control technology (BACT).174 Title 
V permits are general operating permits where one can find all control 
requirements such as PSD and BACT. They also contain monitoring and 
reporting requirements, fee payments, and annual certification by a 
responsible official. For the purposes of Title V, a “major” source is one that 
emits 100 tpy.175 The CAA was designed to protect against pollutants that 
are produced in smaller quantities than greenhouse gases like carbon 
dioxide; which presents a problem for PSD and Title V permitting. According 
to the EPA, if PSD and Title V permitting requirements are applicable 
to major sources as defined by the CAA, many small sources of carbon 
dioxide such as residential and commercial buildings will be unduly 
burdened with the cost of site-specific PSD control technology requirements 
and permit applications.176 For instance, processing one permit for a new or 
modified individual source can require 300 man-hours for the agency to 
process and can cost the facility obtaining the permit several hundred 
thousand dollars.177 Issuing permits to residential and commercial buildings 
is not as difficult but may require 60 man-hours. Requiring permits for small 
sources of greenhouse gas emissions would increase PSD applications 
from 280 a year to 40,000 and cost the permitting agency 250 million 
dollars a year.178 Title V permitting at the 100 tpy threshold would increase 
the applicable number of permits from 15,000 to 6,000,000 and require 340 
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million hours to process, costing 15 billion dollars per year.179 Jonathan 
Adler explains that: 
 
According to the EPA, applying the Clean Air Act as written to 
greenhouse gas emissions would extensively disrupt existing 
regulatory programs, and perhaps make them impossible to 
administer… In this specific case, however, the CAA’s text is explicit, 
and the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA expressly rejected 
the EPA’s claims that applying the Act to greenhouse gases would be 
impossible or inadministrable.180 
 
 
In order to avoid these regulatory problems, the EPA issued the 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
Rule that established new thresholds for the permitting of stationary sources 
of greenhouse gas emissions.181 This appears to put the EPA in the position 
of violating the law it is tasked to enforce. Author Meredith Wilensky writes 
that, “The EPA asserts that it has the authority to exercise the discretion 
found in the Tailoring Rule based on statutory interpretation doctrine which 
provides a highly differentiated standard of review for agency interpretations 
of their governing statutes.”182 The first phase of the Tailoring Rule went into 
effect on January 2, 2011. This phase stated that PSD and Title V permit 
requirements apply only to sources already subject to permitting for non-
greenhouse gas pollutants. These sources will need a PSD permit if they 
emit or are capable of emitting 75,000 tpy of carbon dioxide equivalent. They 
will require Title V permits regardless of emissions levels or related 
requirements.183 The second phase of the Tailoring Rule went into effect on 
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July 1, 2011. In this phase all new stationary sources with the capacity to 
emit at least 100,000 tpy of carbon dioxide equivalent are subject to PSD 
permitting as are phase one sources. In addition, all phase one sources 
subject to permitting and the new sources capable of emitting at least 
100,000 tpy of carbon dioxide equivalent are also subject to Title V 
Permitting.184 Phase three of the Tailoring Rule went into effect in July 2013. 
It did not extend permitting requirements to new stationary sources; it merely 
retained phase one and two permitting requirements.185 All phases of the 
Tailoring Rule apply to coal-fired power plants as they typically emit millions 
of tons of carbon dioxide a year. 
Under the Obama administration, the EPA is using provisions of the 
Clean Air Act to tighten restrictions on coal-fired power plants. On January 1, 
2012, Phase I of the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule began the SO2 and NOx 
trading programs, and sources were to demonstrate compliance with the 
rule by March 1, 2013.186 The trading programs set caps on the production 
of SO2 and NOx to reduce the levels of these pollutants in adjoining states. 
On May 1, 2012, the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule ozone NOx trading 
program began, and sources must demonstrate compliance by December 1, 
2012.187 Phase II of both programs will go into effect in 2014, and sources 
are required to comply with the SO2 and NOx trading program by March 1, 
2015 and the ozone NOx trading program by December 1, 2014.188 The 
Mercury and Toxic Air Rule was finalized on February 16, 2012, and it 
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directly targets toward coal-fired power plants, as they are the greatest 
producers of toxic heavy metals released into the atmosphere.189 New 
power plants will soon be subject to greenhouse gas standards established 
by the EPA on April 24, 2013. As a result of its five year review of ozone 
national ambient air quality standards, the EPA proposes to reduce that 
standard from 75 parts per billion (ppb) to between 60 and 70 ppb. The EPA 
also regulates coal-fired power plants under the Clean Water Act. However, 
this aggressive regulation of coal-fired power plants does appear to be 
reducing CO2 emissions from them. 
From 2008 to 2012, the Obama administration reduced overall CO2 
emissions by 560.0 million metric tons (MMT). Of this reduction, 473.7 MMT 
were from fossil fuels and 447.2 MMT were from coal used in electric power 
generation.190 Therefore, 80 percent of the total reduction in CO2 emissions 
and 94 percent of the CO2 emissions reductions from fossil fuels resulted 
from a decline in the use of coal to fuel electrical power generators. Electric 
utilities reduced their consumption of coal from 1,042,335 thousand tons 
(TT) in 2008 to 860,790 TT in 2013.191 This is a reduction of 181,545 TT, or 
17.4 percent, over the five year period of the Obama administration. The 
electric utilities net generation of electricity from coal went from 1,466,395 
megawatt hours (MGH) in 2008 to 1,190,669 MGH in 2013.192 This is a 
reduction of 275,726 MWH, or 18.8 percent, over the same five year period. 
These reductions were accompanied by the retirement of 145 coal-fired 
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power units from 2010 to 2012, with many more projected to be retired by 
2016.193 This clearly demonstrates that President Obama’s executive 
approach to reducing CO2 emissions from coal-fired power plants is much 
more effective than was President Clinton’s legislative approach. Yet, the 
Obama administration’s executive approach is problematic, despite its 
success. 
The effective execution of a regulatory agenda is dependent on the 
ability and commitment of the executive. It is obvious that President Obama 
has the ability and commitment to effectively regulate the reduction of CO2 
from coal-fired power plants. It seems just as obvious that President Clinton 
had the ability but not the commitment to drive his environmental agenda 
forward. This points to a problem that is inherent in the use of executive 
action by a U. S. President. The President of the United States is limited to 
two four years terms in office. Once his term ends, a new executive takes his 
place. Even if the new president has no objection to the previous executive’s 
agenda, due to differing priorities he may not devote the time and resources 
required to move that agenda forward. The Clinton administration’s effort to 
reduce greenhouse gases is an example of an executive focused on 
priorities other than the reduction of greenhouse gases from coal-fired power 
plants. Ronald Brunner and Roberta Klein write, “. . . improvements in the 
Action Plan have been obstructed by its relatively low priority. More 
resources, including attention, have been invested in projecting aggregate 
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emissions reductions, developing predictive understanding of global change 
under the U. S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), and 
negotiating a legally-binding international agreement under the Framework 
Convention.”194 The problem of executive action is more evident if the new 
Executive is opposed to the previous president’s political policies. Elmes and 
Harris explain this, writing of the Reagan administration’s environmental 
policy, that, “A second phase of government policy began during the 1980s 
when a conservative Republican administration effectively disabled the 
major regulatory agencies (EPA, DOE, DOC) and unleashed a period of 
unrestrained laissez-faire economic policy.”195 Thus, any effective gains 
toward the reduction of CO2 from coal-fired power plants may be undone by 
the next executive. A well-crafted law, however, has the advantages of 
longevity, of not being reversible by a single executive, and of keeping the 
executive focused on enforcing regulations rather than researching, 
promulgating, and implementing regulations. 
An examination of the recent reduction of greenhouse gases, reveals 
that much of the reduction in CO2 emissions from coal-fired power plants 
resulted from a reduction in the use of coal rather than compliance with the 
technological provisions of the Clean Air Act and its amendments. The CO2 
emissions reductions from coal-fired power plants were achieved by 
regulating the electric utilities to the point that it was more economically 
viable to shut down older coal-fired plants and to cancel the construction of 
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new power plants than to comply with the EPA regulations. As noted above, 
the reduction in CO2 emissions from coal fired power plants was not an 
actual reduction of CO2 in the emissions from coal-fired power plants; it was 
a reduction in the amount of coal used to generate electricity. These 
reductions resulted from the closure of over 145 coal-fired electric 
generating units that have were forced out of the market by EPA 
regulation and competition from natural gas. The Department of Energy 
predicts that closures of coal-fired power plants will continue up to the year 
2016.196 
When President Obama leaves office, will the next executive keep this 
economic pressure on the politically powerful coal and electric utility 
industries? This depends on the new executive’s administrative priorities. 
Emissions from coal-fired power plants increased from the time that the 
CAAA of 1970 was passed until 2008. The reduction of emissions from coal 
fired power plants were delayed by the energy needs of the 1970s and 
1980s, by the politics of the Reagan administration, and by a lack of 
commitment during the Clinton administration. The reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions became a political goal in the early 1990s and began in 2009. 
Why, after over forty years of research, did it take twenty years to bring 
about a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power 
plants? 
An examination of the Clean Air Act should provide some insight into 
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the difficulties of reducing greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power 
plants. This examination will show that the Clean Air Act was a new kind of 
administrative law that rejected the state regulatory agencies of the New 
Deal. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 did not insulate the EPA from 
national politics, judicial intervention or interference from the legislature. It 
will show that the Act was agency forcing, in that it established deadlines for 
implementation of standards and for attaining those standards. The Act also 
tried to force how those standards were to be achieved. It controlled the 
States and the EPA Administrator in every aspect of the development, 
approval, and implementation of air quality standards and State 
Implementation Plans (SIP). The Clean Air Act was designed to place the 
responsibility of the complex problem of controlling atmospheric pollution on 
the EPA Administrator while controlling the executive’s actions. The law 
forced technological solutions on stationary air pollution sources that were 
not economically feasible for coal-fired power plants to adopt. It controlled 
judicial review of the promulgation of air quality standards and the approval 
of SIPs. Yet, the Act’s requirement to avoid technological and economic 
considerations encouraged litigation by the electric utilities against the EPA. 
This examination will show that Congressional intervention was the greatest 
factor in preventing coal-fired power companies from complying with the 
law. This study will begin with the early development of environmental law 
and congressional trends in law making that began during the 1940s. 
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The Clean Air Act 
In the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, photo-chemical smog covered a 
number of metropolitan areas and towns causing thousands of deaths. Doug 
Haydel proclaimed that, “Smog is a killer. In October 1948 the town of 
Donora, Pennsylvania was blanketed by heavy smog. When rain washed 
the smog away, six thousand of the town’s fourteen thousand residents had 
become ill, and eighteen eventually died. In December 1952, a deadly smog 
struck London, causing four thousand deaths . . . and New York was 
attacked by a killer smog in 1953.”197 These events caused the Democratic 
majorities in the House of Representatives and Senate of the 84th U.S. 
Congress to pass the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955.198 The bill was 
signed by Republican President Dwight Eisenhower. This was the federal 
government’s first legislative action to address the problem of air pollution.199 
The law provided funds to study air pollution and research possible solutions 
to the problem. Author Keith Castro writes that, “The first attempt at federal 
legislation was the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955. It authorized the 
Surgeon General of the United States to study the basic problem of air 
pollution; to financially support research, training and demonstration 
projects; and to provide technical assistance to state and local government 
upon request.”200 
In 1963, Democratic majorities in both houses of the 88th Congress 
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presented the Clean Air Act to President Lyndon Johnson and it became 
the first federal law to implement corrective action in order to solve the 
problem of controlling air pollution.201 Castro declared that, “The federal role 
was significantly enhanced in 1963 with the passage of the Clean Air Act, 
which authorized the federal government to conduct additional research on 
air pollution, to make grants to state air pollution control agencies, and to 
intervene legally to abate interstate pollution.”202 The pollution control 
policies of the 1963 Act failed to obtain favorable results, and members of 
the public and the federal government pushed for reform. Jonathan Foster 
explained that, “By 1967 many in the federal government realized that the 
Clean Air Act of 1963 had failed. Air pollution continued unabated and 
public sentiment in polluted areas shifted in favor of meaningful reform.”203 
The Air Quality Act of 1967, enacted by a Democratic majority in the 90th 
Congress and President Johnson, began to shape the future of 
environmental law in the United States by expanding the federal 
government’s regulatory approach to controlling air pollution. Castro wrote 
that, “The 1967 Air Quality Act deviated from its predecessors by taking a 
distinctly regulatory approach for the first time…. The Act required the 
states to establish, adopt, and submit to HEW ‘ambient air quality 
standards’ for ‘air quality control regions’ within those states…. And the 
concept of state ambient air quality standards is the forerunner of the 
present national ambient air quality standards.”204 
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It is relevant to note a tendency in congressional law-making that 
involved the extension of congressional power into the area of executive 
responsibility, which accelerated in the 1940s and early 1950s. This 
extension of power is accomplished by the use of statutes with provisions 
that allowed Congress to perform or compel executive action, repeal 
statutes, or to subject executive action to the approval or disapproval of 
congressional committees.205 This was accomplished by congressional use 
of concurrent resolutions.206  Robert Ginnane stated that, “In recent years 
Congress has made a number of experiments in vesting certain 
governmental powers in boards and commissions composed at least in part 
of members of Congress, and in subjecting specified types of executive or 
administrative action to the approval or disapproval of congressional 
committees.”207 Ginnane cites twenty-eight acts passed by Congress from 
1939 to 1953 that contain statutory provisions extending the administrative 
control of Congress by the use of concurrent resolutions or committee 
authorization of executive action.208 Twenty-seven of the acts were passed 
in this fourteen year period by congresses with Democratic majorities in 
both houses (except for a Republican majority in the Senate of the 80th   
Congress) and with a Democratic president in office.209 This indicates that 
these provisions were not motivated by party affiliation, but by institutional 
affiliation. As environmental law developed in the 1950s and 1960s, so did 
the congressional intrusion in to the executive responsibility. The Clean Air 
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Act Amendments of 1970 reflect an extensive regulatory intrusion into the 
administrative responsibilities of the executive branch of government. 
This intrusion by Congress into the realm of executive administration 
is in part a response to the expansion of executive power that came about 
as a result of the New Deal. The New Deal had created regulatory agencies 
based on what Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler call the New Deal 
Ideal.210 The authors quoted James Landis about the advantages of the 
New Deal agency, writing: 
 
In the words of James Landis, the most thoughtful of the New Deal 
theorist, those with experience in legislative matters … recognize 
that it is easier to plot a way through a labyrinth of detail when it is 
done in the comparative quiet of a[n agency] (sic) conference room 
than when it is attempted amid the turmoil of a legislative chamber or 
committee room. Rather than tying the agency’s hands with a host of 
particular rules and detailed instructions, Congress should content 
itself with the most general kind of policy guidance.211  
 
 
According to the authors, the New Deal agency should be insulated from 
national politics. They explained that, “By making the agency ‘independent’ 
from the executive, and endowing it with multiple commissioners, the New 
Deal makes it difficult for a momentary national impulse to place its mark on 
the course of agency policy.”212 Ackerman and Hassler also wrote, “But the 
New Deal agency is not only to be insulated from national politics; it is also 
to be insulated from judicial oversight. The overriding aim of administrative 
law is to discourage the courts from displacing expert policy judgments by 
63  
their own legalistic readings of the statute.”213 The most rigorous form of 
insulation of the New Deal agency from national politics is cooperative 
federalism. The authors asserted that, “An even more extreme form of 
insulation is provided by ‘cooperative federalism.’ Here, the states, operating 
under loose federal supervision, are asked to design a program responsive 
to the peculiarities of local conditions.”214 It is the performance of 
these New Deal agencies in the states that Congress was trying to move 
beyond in the 1970 CAAA. 
Environmental regulation, according to New Deal standards, was 
rejected because of growing skepticism based on past experiences with 
New Deal agencies. Ackerman and Hassler explained that, “When legal 
activist tried to give their environmental hopes statutory expression in the 
early seventies, their concrete experiences gave added point to the growing 
suspicion of New Deal models among the American establishment.”215 This 
experience came from state efforts to protect the environment. The authors 
state that, “Before 1970, environmental protection was principally a matter 
for the states, rather than the federal government; and when 
environmentalist surveyed the state scene, the agencies they observed 
seemed a parody of New Deal hopes.”216 Ackerman and Hassler wrote of 
the new generation’s lack of confidence in the New Deal agency’s policy-
making expertise, stating: 
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They had relapsed instead into the old lawyer-ridden ways of case-
by-case adjudication, laboring mightily through procedural labyrinths, 
without successfully defining basic directions for future regulation. 
Rather than becoming a home for dedicated experts, the independent 
commission seemed a revolving door for lawyers hoping to gain 
inside experience that could later be cashed out in lucrative private 
practice. Rather than encouraging an impartial search for public 
interest the collegial structure of the independent agency mired 
would-be policymakers in collective indecision.217 
 
 
These observations of New Deal agencies in the states hardened into a 
more general criticism of the New Deal itself as the authors explained, 
asserting, “These criticisms of agency performance merged, sometime 
imperceptibly, into a more radical critique of the New Deal ideal itself. This 
line of attack saw expertise as a myth concealing the inevitability of hard 
value choices, political insulation as a screen concealing the capture of the 
agency by special interest.”218 
The experiences that Congress had with the implementation of the 
Clean Air Act of 1963 and its amendment the Air Quality Act of 1967 led 
Congress to amend the Clean Air Act again in 1970. However, Democratic 
majorities in both houses of the 91st Congress had goals other than the 
efficient regulation of air pollution.219 Ackerman and Hassler wrote of the 
CAAA of 1970, that, “Statutes passed in the 1970s did more than commit 
hundreds of billions of dollars to the cause of environmental protection in 
the years ahead. They also represent part of a complex effort by which the 
present generation is revising the system of administrative law inherited 
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from the New Deal.”220 At the height of the Environmental Movement 
Congress acted to clean up the environment and to correct the 
deficiencies of the New Deal agencies. The authors explained that, “When 
Congress reacted to Earth Day, it set about to do more than clean the 
water and purify the air; it also sought a new shape for the administrative 
process—one that would avoid the use of ‘expertise’ as an excuse for 
inaction and that would protect agencies from capture by special 
interest.”221 Congress wanted the New Deal agencies to be efficient 
regulators, but they were no longer willing refrain from correcting the 
problems with ideal New Deal agencies. Ackerman and Hassler explained 
that: 
 
On the one hand, there was an increasing impatient demand that 
the agencies finally redeem their New Deal promise by generating 
clear standards through creative rule making. On the other hand, 
there was a temptation to tinker with the institutional corollaries 
associated with the New Deal Ideal. If existing agencies did not 
redeem New Deal ideals, perhaps some creative legislature or 
judicial responses would make a difference.222 
 
 
In the 1970 CAAA, Congress attempted to correct the ideals of the New 
Deal agencies in a number of ways. 
When Congress established the Environmental Protection Agency in 
1970, it began its efforts to correct what it saw as the problems with 
regulatory agencies.223 Ackerman and Hassler asserted that, “Instead of 
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permitting a group of ‘independent’ commissioners to run off indifferent 
directions, the Act places primary responsibility on a single Administrator 
squarely situated within the executive branch.”224 Thus, the EPA was not 
insulated from national politics and was dependent on the executive branch 
to administer the Clean Air Act. The act did not insulate the EPA from judicial 
intervention as Samuel Bleicher indicated when he wrote, “Moreover in 
presenting section 304, which provides for citizen suits against source 
operators for violation of ‘an emission standard or limitation’ and against the 
Administrator for ‘. . . failure to perform any act or duty … which is not 
discretionary with the Administrator.” 225 While the CAAA of 1970 left the  
major responsibility for the regulation of local environments in state hands, 
the states were dominated by federal control. Edward Dunkelberger wrote 
that, “EPA sought to provide guidance and direction to the states in its fairly 
detailed regulations relating to ambient air quality standards, requirements 
for preparation, adaptation, and submission of state implementations, and 
conditions for approval of implementation plans by the EPA.”226 
Dunkelberger explained the reason for EPA dominance of the state’s 
environmental regulation, stating, “The plain fact is, however, that most state 
agencies found that they did not have the necessary expertise to formulate 
an implementation plan that would assure attainment of the primary and 
secondary standards for each of six primary and secondary air quality 
standards in each region of the state.”227 As noted above, Congress was 
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aware of the deficiencies of state resources. Thus, EPA dominance over the 
states was achieved by detailed regulation and the fact that states lacked 
the resources to regulate the environment. It appears that the congressional 
attempt to make New Deal agencies more efficient by correcting the 
corollaries on which they were based was a mistake. 
New Deal agencies were created based the corollaries of the New 
Deal Ideal. These corollaries stipulated that experts in the uncontentious 
atmosphere of an agency board room would find it easier to sift through the 
vast amounts of scientific information. Hence, they would be more efficient 
regulators of the environment than congress. However, this could only be 
achieved if the agency was insulated from national politics. Thus, the agency 
should be insulated from congressional intervention and independent of the 
Executive branch. Judicial intervention was to be minimalized, and the 
primary responsibility of rule-making was to be carried out by the states 
under loose federal supervision. The problem with the New Deal Ideal is that 
it was an ideal. New Deal agencies and the commissioners who ran them 
were not accountable to Congress, the executive branch, or the courts. They 
had closer ties to the interests of their local communities than they had to the 
national interests that were attempting regulate environmental pollutants. As 
thoughtful as James Landis was, it does not appear to have occurred to him 
that many persons placed in positions of authority and power without 
accountability will act in their own interest, especially, if one’s interest 
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coincides with the interest of the rich and powerful in one’s local community. 
When Congress placed the EPA under the Executive branch and legislated 
judicial intervention, it promoted the political and legislative intervention that 
limited the successful enforcement of the Clean Air Act. The new 
administrative approach did not solve the regulatory problems that would 
plagued the Clean Air Act. It merely departed from the ideal corollaries of a 
failed administrative regime. 
In order to prevent the bureaucratic inertia that that affected the New 
Deal agencies, Congress used the CAAA to control the EPA Administrator. 
It imposed deadlines for setting and meeting air quality standards and 
specified how those standards were to be met. Writers Ackerman and 
Hassler asserted that: 
 
First, the Act requires the Administrator to set qualitative clean air 
targets that would ‘protect the public’s health’ while allowing for an 
‘adequate margin of safety’ and to reach targets by 1977 at the 
latest. In taking this step, Congress forced the agency to specify its 
ends more clearly than required by the new deal model. … At the 
same time it energetically pursued this ends-forcing strategy. 
Congress treated a second form of agency forcing in a more 
ambivalent way. Once having set air quality targets, the next step 
was to define the best means of achieving clean air targets by 
1977.228 
 
 
Setting air quality targets, compliance deadlines, and the means of reaching 
such targets was highly problematic in the early days of the CAAA of 1970. 
Scientific and technological information was not sufficiently adequate to 
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perform these tasks. Martin and Symington reported that in Congressional 
discussions of the Air Quality Act of 1967, congressional leaders stated their 
awareness that this lack of knowledge would be a barrier to solving the 
problems of air pollution and environmental control. The authors wrote that, 
“The context of the legislation thus was one not only of urgent need but also, 
as both Chairman Harley Staggers of the House Committee and Chairman 
Muskie had pointed out, of recognition that here was no immediate panacea 
to the nation’s air pollution problems, in large part because of the gap in 
knowledge and technology.”229 
Ackerman and Hassler believed that the control of emissions from 
coal- fired electric utilities was a significant problem at the time and would 
continue to be in the future. They explained that, their study, “. . . also 
focuses upon a crucial substantive policy issue: the future of the coal-
burning power plant. At present, such plants contribute forty-eight percent of 
all electric power produced in the United States. This share will grow over 
the next half century. With oil scarce, nuclear risky, and hydro limited, the 
nation’s rich and cheap coal reserves call for exploitation.”230 With the 
enactment of the CAAA of 1970, the federal government exerted dominant 
control over environmental regulation. The Act was also technology forcing 
as Keith Castro wrote, “The 1970 Amendments reflect a full-fledged effort to 
establish a comprehensive, technology-forcing, enforcement-oriented 
regulatory scheme with strong sanctions and an overriding if not 
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predominant federal presence.”231 Section 111 of the CAAA of 1970 
authorizes the EPA Administrator to set New Source Performance 
Standards for new or modified stationary sources such as coal-fired power 
plants. It also calls for the EPA to base NSPS on the best system of 
emissions reduction.232 It appears that Congress did not intend for the EPA 
to consider the economic and technological feasibility of meeting the 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) or NSPS. Samuel Bleicher 
asserted that, “. . . the Act neither grants EPA the authority nor provides a 
procedure to suspend implementation of the SIP or postpone required 
attainments of NAAQS for economic or technological reasons.”233 This 
statement was supported by a quote from the opening statement of a 
Senate Committee report on stationary sources that said, “Therefore the 
Committee determined that existing sources of pollutants either should meet 
the standard of the law or be closed down, and in addition that new sources 
should be controlled to the maximum extent possible to prevent atmospheric 
emissions.”234 It appears that the EPA understood the intent of Congress 
with regard to the regulation of coal-fired power plants. 
Ackerman and Hassler wrote of the EPA’s approach to regulating 
coal-fired power plants that, “It treated the power plant problem as if it 
were an engineering exercise insulated from critical ecological and 
economic issues.”235 
In considering the best systems of emissions reduction for state air quality 
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control regions, the EPA failed to consider many factors such as wind, 
proximity to population, and stack height that effect regional air quality 
standards. Instead, it focused on the technological aspects of controlling air 
pollution. The authors asserted that, “Unless the EPA defined the ‘best 
system of emissions reduction’ to take account of these complexities, 
however, section 111 could read to authorize a narrow inquiry into the 
technological design of the plant rather than a canvass of the ecological 
stakes involved in new construction.”236 Because of the deficiencies in 
scientific and technological knowledge, “Those methods of control that are 
technologically and economically feasible today may not may not be 
sufficiently effective to achieve the desired ambient air quality. Therefore, 
where this is true, as technology advances, the states should prescribe new 
requirements, on a continually more restrictive basis until a satisfactory 
standard is achieved.”237 The EPA’s technological interpretation of section 
111 and the lack of consideration of the technological and economic 
feasibility in setting and meeting air quality standards forced the operators of 
coal-fired power plants to invest large sums of money in pollution control 
technologies that would have to be replaced or modified as scientific 
information developed. The electric utility companies took these issues of 
economic and technologic feasibility in meeting air quality standards to the 
courts. Thus, judicial intervention into the regulation of the environment 
began in a big way. 
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Samuel Bleicher wrote that, “The time schedules established by the 
Clean Air Act Amendments made intercircuit controversy almost 
unavoidable. Since all SIPs were approved at the same time, the thirty-day 
period for filing section 307 challenges produced simultaneous litigation on 
similar if not identical issues in most of the courts of appeals.”238 The initial 
result of this judicial intervention was that: 
 
Four courts of appeals, under the tutelage of the electric utilities, 
concluded that the Administrator must consider economic and 
technological factors either at the SIP approval stage, at the 
enforcement stage, or both. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court and five 
other courts of appeals, at the urging of the National Resources 
Defense Council (NRDC), announced rulings founded on the 
proposition that achievement of NAAQS by the tree-year statutory 
deadline is an unequivocal mandate of the Act that cannot be 
avoided because of economic or technical feasibility.239  
 
 
According to Bleicher, the result of this judicial intervention was that, “By 
mid-1975, however, neither NAAQS nor compliance with SIP emissions 
limitations have been achieved, and the most important stationary source 
polluters, the electric utilities, had largely succeeded in avoiding even the 
initiation of compliance programs.”240 This initial intervention of the courts 
was unexpected because Congress had attempted to control judicial 
intervention into the EPA Administrators actions with regard to setting 
NAAQS and approving SIPs. One of the requirements of Section 307 (b) (1) 
of the CAAA with regard to petitions that challenged the promulgation of 
73  
NAAQS and the approval of SIPs was that, “Any such petition shall be filed 
within 30 days from the date of such promulgation or approval, or after such 
date if such petition is based solely on grounds arising after such 30th 
day.”241 Many electric utilities wanted to challenge NAAQS and SIP 
approvals because they believed they were too restrictive. Dunkelberger 
explained that, “More than one company or industry seeking to challenge a 
state implementation plan designed to carry out primary and secondary 
standards has concluded that a large part of its difficulty resided in the fact 
that the standard in question was unduly restrictive.”242 However, most of 
these companies failed to meet the requirements of Section 307 (b) (1) 
because, “In most instances these objections to the standard itself were not 
apparent at the time of promulgation of the standard, for it was by no means 
clear how the standard would be implemented for particular industries and 
sources.”243 It was at the approval stage of SIPs that the effected industries 
and sources became aware of the consequences of the EPA’s standard. 
Dunkelberger wrote that: 
 
Only with the adaptation of an implementation plan, applicable to 
particular industries and sources, did the effect of an unduly 
restrictive standard become clear, but by that time judicial review was 
no longer available. The provisions of Section 307 (b) (1) were 
consistently upheld despite the numerous petitions filed against the 
EPA approval of SIPs. The author states that, “The courts have 
repeatedly emphasized that unless a petition for review is filed within 
the 30-day period as specified in Section 307 (b) (1) there can be no 
review of standards as promulgated, either in a subsequent suit 
challenging an implementation plan provision, or in enforcement 
74  
action seeking to carry out the provisions of an implementation 
plan.244 
 
 
Thus, as Dunkelberger commented, “At the early stage EPA promulgated 
primary and secondary air quality standards for six major pollutants and in 
each case the standard is final and no longer subject to review.”245 
Therefore, Congress was able to control judicial review of the establishment 
of NAAQS by the EPA Administrator. Congress instituted other provisions of 
the CAAA that used judicial review to take away the agency’s discretion and 
to force the EPA to act to regulate the environment. 
Although Congress had attempted to control the initial instances of 
judicial intervention, it mandated such intervention in two other sections of 
the CAAA. The enforcement provisions of Section 113 of the CAAA provides 
civil and criminal penalties for violations of the Act, but these penalties can 
only be imposed on violators through federal lawsuits. Ronald Rosenburg 
noted that, “Environmental law authorizes a range of enforcement 
techniques that impose both civil remedies—injunctive and financial—and 
criminal penalties. However, both of these enforcement methods require a 
federal enforcement lawsuit.”246 While there is nothing unusual in court 
action to proscribe penalties for violations of the law, this speaks to the great 
expense that numerous of federal lawsuits incur. This expense is greatly 
increased by one of the most agency forcing sections of the CAAA. Section 
304, authorizes citizen lawsuits to force the EPA Administrator to act in 
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areas where he has no discretion. In instances where the EPA Administrator 
is required to act, he only has the discretion to set the priorities for actions to 
be taken. Section 304 expands judicial intervention and effectively allows 
citizens to set the priorities for administrative action. 
During the 1980s, the Reagan administration’s laissez faire 
economic policies effectively disabled regulatory agencies such as the 
EPA, but many lawsuits were initiated to force the agency to act. Donald 
Strait and Richard Ayers wrote that, “While the EPA flounders the 
National Resources Defense Council, the American Lung Association, 
and other public health, and environmental organizations are turning to 
the courts to enforce the Clean Air Act.”247 Many of these lawsuit were 
directed toward a particular end with regard to the EPA Administrator’s 
enforcement of the law. Strait and Ayers wrote that, “Lawsuits have been 
filed in New York and New Jersey to require that significant ozone 
reduction strategies be carried out.”248 The authors also noted that 
judicial intervention with regard to ozone reduction was being initiated in 
Massachusetts, Philadelphia, Chicago, and other places.249 The limited 
success of these lawsuits in reducing ozone emissions and the sometime 
debilitating results of court decisions (as in the 2007 Massachusetts v. 
EPA) make the expense of this agency forcing strategy questionable. 
The lack of political insulation from the executive control and from judicial 
intervention was not as detrimental to the enforcement of the CAAA as 
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congressional intervention. 
The original Clean Air Act was passed in 1963 and the first 
Congressional intervention was its amendment by the Air Quality Act of 
1967. Author Keith Castro explained that, “The 1967 Air Quality Act 
deviated from its predecessors by taking a distinctly regulatory approach 
for the first time. The Act required the states to establish, adopt, and submit 
to HEW ‘ambient air quality standards’ for air quality control regions within 
those states.”250 The second Congressional intervention into the Clean Air 
Act were the previously discussed amendments of 1970. The 1977 Clean 
Air Act Amendments were primarily concerned with maintaining NAAQS in 
geographical regions in which the standard had been met, and it placed 
new requirements on sources in regions that had not met NAAQS.251 
Prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) provisions placed permit 
requirements on new or modified stationary sources that required that 
best available control technology (BACT) to be used in air control regions 
that had attained NAAQS; it placed BACT requirements on new and 
modified stationary sources in air quality regions that had not attained 
NAAQS.252 The amendments of 1977 suspended compliance to NAAQS 
for up eight months in a national or regional energy emergency that 
resulted from a shortage of energy supplies or high levels of 
unemployment. (NIH 2014) 253 The 1977 amendments extended the 
operation of any stationary source that did not comply with NAAQS if an 
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economic emergency arose as a result of unemployment caused by the 
closure. The last direct Congressional intervention into Clean Air Act 
occurred with the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The 1990 
amendments expanded judicial intervention by providing monetary 
awards for citizen cases brought against pollution sources and the EPA. It 
granted new enforcement powers to the EPA by allowing it to issue 
penalty orders up to $200,000.00 and citations up to $5,000.00 for lesser 
violations. It also increased penalties for both civil and criminal violations 
of the Act. Thus, under the CAAA of 1977 and 1990 Congress expanded 
the technology and agency forcing provisions of the Clean Air Act, and it 
gave the EPA the power to penalize violators of the regulations that it 
promulgates. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Conclusions 
Which approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions from coal-
fired power plants is the most effective, the legislative approach of the 
Clinton administration or the executive approach of the Obama 
administration? The short answer to this question is that the Obama 
administration has been more effective in reducing the emission greenhouse 
gases from coal-fired power plants. Yet, it appears that the efficiency of the 
Obama administration in reducing greenhouse gases from coal fired power 
plants may have more to do with the commitment of the executive, rather 
than the approach taken. Under the Constitution of the United States, both 
the legislative and executive approaches are required to carry out the law. 
The Congress enacts law through the legislative power granted solely to it 
by the Constitution. The Executive may propose law and veto law, but it is 
not empowered to make law. While Congress may enact law, it requires the 
Executive power to enforce it. 
President Clinton’s attempt to reduce greenhouse gas emissions was 
not supported by the provisions of the Clean Air Act. Thus, any executive 
action to reduce greenhouse gases would have been unconstitutional. 
President Clinton’s primary response was to propose an energy tax that 
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would have reduced the use of fossil fuels from all sources. When Congress 
failed to pass his energy tax, President Clinton pursued a modest voluntary 
plan to reduce greenhouse emissions from industrial sources of greenhouse 
gases. In the remaining seven years of his presidency, he showed little or no 
interest in reviving his legislative approach to control greenhouse gases. 
When President Obama came to office, he proposed a cap and trade bill to 
reduce carbon emissions. When Congress failed to pass his proposal, he 
was able to pursue the reduction of greenhouse gases by executive 
regulation. This was because the Supreme Court had expanded the 
authority of the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, 
President Obama has been able to use his executive power to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act. However, the Clean Air 
Act has proven to be very difficult to enforce and is subject to the political 
views of the Executive. 
The reason that President Obama has succeeded in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power plants is that he is 
personally committed to this goal. President Clinton could have reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power plants in the same way as 
President Obama, promulgating rules and regulations to reduce SO2, NOx, 
and other pollutants that would have forced the closure of older coal-fired 
power plants and prevented the construction of newer plants. This would 
have also reduced greenhouse gas emissions. Clinton’s priority was the 
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maintenance of the economy, not the reduction of greenhouse gases from 
coal-fired power plants. President Clinton does not appear to have opposed 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, he simply placed a higher priority on 
maintaining the economy. As effective as President Obama’s administration 
is in reducing CO2 emissions from coal-fired power plants, President 
Reagan’s administration was just as effective in disabling the regulatory 
abilities of the EPA. Thus, the regulation of the environment and the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions seems to depend more on the 
Executive’s commitment, rather than the CAAA’s provisions. 
This developed because Congress attempted to write the detailed 
provisions of the CAAA in a way that controlled the environment through 
executive action, while controlling the Executive at the same time. As a 
result, environmental law became a political issue between Congress and 
the Executive branch. Another result of placing the EPA under the Executive 
branch was that environmental science and the science of anthropogenic 
global warming became political issues rather than scientific solutions. The 
Department of Energy funded early global warming research. However, it 
was subject to the same science for policy influences as the EPA. The 
rejection of the New Deal Ideal by Congress in the early 1970s was not 
accompanied by an effort to salvage what worked in the New Deal agencies; 
it was accomplished by a reversal of the corollaries that were supposed to 
make New Deal agencies superior regulators. 
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Congress placed the EPA under control of the Executive branch and 
at the same time intruded into the executive’s responsibility to enforce the 
law. This made environmental law subject to the political views of the 
President and opposing political forces in Congress. Congress left the 
responsibility of the environmental control of air pollution to the states, but 
placed the states under the detailed regulation of the EPA. This made 
CAAA’s enforcement a political issue between the states and the federal 
government and between local and national interests. In effect, Congress 
removed the advantages of political insulation through state control by 
submitting that control to close federal supervision. It also retained the 
disadvantages of state control by subjecting environmental regulation to the 
influence of local interests. Congress encouraged judicial intervention 
through inflexible policies with regard to the economic and technological 
feasibility of meeting air quality standards. It also encouraged the courts to 
intervene through Section 304 and the enforcement provisions of the act. 
This caused delays in the implementation of environmental programs as the 
courts sorted through the complex legalities of the act. This greatly 
increased the expense of implementing and enforcing the Clean Air Act. In 
some cases, the court interpreted the CAAA in ways that were contrary to 
the intent of those who framed the law. It also hampered the EPA 
Administrator by allowing the courts to set implementation and enforcement 
priorities favored by special interest groups rather than the Administrator. 
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Thus, the CAAA, as enacted by Congress, created political division between 
all the component organizations responsible for controlling air pollution. 
When Congress placed the EPA under the control of the Executive 
branch, it transferred the responsibility of cleaning up the environment to the 
Executive. Its goal was to control the agency and its administrator in a way 
that would solve the problem of “bureaucratic inertia” through the detailed 
requirements of the act.254 Congress made the EPA responsible for setting 
air quality standards, approving state implementation plans, and conducting 
enormous research programs to fill the scientific and technological 
information gap. This transfer of responsibility to control environmental air 
pollution was accompanied by a transfer of legislative authority to the 
Executive branch of government. The Executive branch was no longer 
responsible for merely enforcing the law. Congress delegated to the 
Executive the legislative responsibility to set standards, to enforce them, and 
later, to penalize their violation. Hence, Congress complemented the 
enforcement power of the Executive branch with the legislative and judicial 
power to set the standards of the law and to adjudicate and punish the 
violators. It is little wonder that the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
from coal-fired power plants has come to depend on the political agenda of 
the Executive. Just as President Obama has set the standards and enforced 
them on the coal industry and the electric utilities, President Reagan refused 
to set the standards or to enforce the regulations of the Clean Air Act. In 
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each case, the political opponents of the President were unable change the 
political agenda of the Executive. Even the Democratic majorities in both 
houses of Congress during the Reagan administration’s two terms were 
unable to affect a change in his political agenda.255 By assigning the 
responsibility of scientific and technical research to the Executive branch, 
Congress made the Executive more independent and the science more 
political. 
The development of scientific research to set air quality standards and 
develop technical solutions to air pollution was relegated to the Executive 
branch of government by the Congress. Congress also pushed the direction 
of this research by the agency-forcing and technology-forcing provisions of 
the CAAA. The act forced the EPA to set air quality standards based on 
inadequate scientific information. Under Section 111, it forced technological 
solutions to emission controls for new stationary sources. Once the EPA set 
air quality standards and committed to particular technical solutions for 
controlling emissions from stationary sources, it was committed to a 
particular policy of pollution control. It became necessary for the EPA to 
promote scientific findings that supported the policies to which it was 
committed. Thus, the vast amounts of money devoted to scientific research 
were directed toward the scientific programs that supported the EPA’s 
regulatory agenda. Congress relinquished much of its ability to oversee the 
environmental program because it depended on the EPA and the Executive 
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branch research programs for its policy information. Thus, the amendments 
that Congress subsequently passed continued to expand the agency and 
technology-forcing provisions already in place. Those in the scientific 
community who disputed the science that supported the EPA were not 
recognized as having valid scientific objections. Because environmental 
research, including global warming research, had political goals rather than 
merely scientific objectives, those persons who were politically opposed to 
environmental policy based their objections on the opposing scientific 
views. Hence, the science of air pollution control and global warming from 
man-made greenhouse gas emissions became political rhetoric for or 
against the government’s environmental policy. The fact that Congress left 
responsibility for air pollution control in the states created other problems 
for the control of emissions from coal-fired power plants. 
In 1987, Donald Strait and Richard Ayers wrote that, “Despite the 17-
year history of the Clean Air Act, certain chemical operations, oil refinery 
processes, and other important industrial sources of smog causing pollution 
remain unregulated in most states. Somehow, EPA has avoided formally 
evaluating what kinds of controls are practiced for those sources, and this 
bureaucratic inertia has become an excuse for states to avoid clamping 
down on local interest.”256 This assessment of EPA and state performance in 
the regulation of stationary sources seems accurate. In 1987, Ronald 
Reagan was in the third year of his second term, and the EPA and other 
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regulatory agencies were inactive under the laissez faire economics of the 
Reagan administration. The states were free of federal control just as they 
were under the New Deal state agencies of the late 1960s. State and local 
interests were aligned with the economic interest of the administration. 
Hence, many stationary sources of carbon dioxide, such as coal- fired power 
plants, were allowed to operate with minimal control. This was not a new 
situation because from 1973 to the late 1980s, the local interests of coal- 
fired power plants aligned with national energy policy. During these years, 
the Congress and the presidential administrations of Gerald Ford and Jimmy 
Carter called for power plants to convert to coal. Congress and both 
presidents called for and passed legislation to exempt coal-fired power 
plants from compliance to environmental laws and to convert from less 
polluting fuels to coal. Thus, the electric utilities were able to resist 
compliance to environmental legislation. This antagonized environmentalist 
and led to greater political division between supporters and opponents of 
environmental regulation. The problems caused by not insulating the EPA 
from the Executive and leaving responsibility of air pollution control to the 
states under tight federal control were exacerbated by the act’s 
encouragement of judicial intervention. 
The inflexibility of the policy that would not allow consideration of 
the economic and technological feasibility of the application of the 
technological solutions under Section 111 of the CAAA caused numerous 
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lawsuits between pollution sources and the EPA. These lawsuits caused 
delays in the setting of standards and the implementation of control 
policies while the issues were resolved by the courts. However, the 
continuous litigation caused by Section 304 of the CAAA resulted in 
untold expense. It has also pushed the agency into regulating 
greenhouse gas emissions under a law that was designed to regulate 
pollutants which are produced in smaller quantities than greenhouse 
gases. In the 2007 Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, the 
Court declared that the EPA could regulate greenhouse gases under the 
CAAA. In 2009, when EPA Administrator found that greenhouse gases 
from automobiles were air pollutants that posed a threat to public health 
and welfare, the agency-forcing provisions of the CAAA required that 
coal-fired power plants be regulated to reduce the emission of CO2. 
Because the quantities of emissions required for PSD and Title V 
permitting were designed for pollutants that were emitted at much lower 
rates, the regulation of greenhouse gases under the CAAA required 
new thresholds for major stationary sources. If greenhouse gases were 
regulated under the old thresholds, it would greatly increase the number of 
sources requiring PSD and Title V permitting. This would create onerous 
financial burdens for these smaller sources and an administrative nightmare 
for the EPA. The EPA could not avoid this problem because the decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA specifically rejected the idea that greenhouse gases 
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were not administrable under the CAAA. Thus, the EPA reinterpreted the 
law and established new thresholds for major sources of greenhouse gases. 
This judicial intervention by the Supreme Court has weakened a seriously 
flawed law and is detrimental to the rule of law in general. 
The reduction of greenhouse gases depends on the President’s 
intent. This is because Congress has ceded legislative power to the 
President to finish writing the law by establishing air quality standards. This 
weakens the law because the scope of any president’s actions under the 
CAAA is limited by his time in office. Hence, whatever environmental gains 
are achieved under a particular president may be, but often are not, 
maintained by the new Executive. Thus, while executive action is effective, 
decisive, and flexible; it lacks longevity. If a president or an EPA 
administrator under the direction of a president can change the 
requirements of the law, the law itself becomes subject not only to national 
politics, but to the President’s preferences. The advantage of law is that it is 
an established guideline that will last until it is repealed by the Congress. 
Those that are subject to the law know what the law is and what they must 
do to obey it. However, if the executive is allowed to change those 
guidelines without authorization from Congress, those subject to the law will 
not know whether their future actions will be within the law. It is not 
economically feasible for a power plant to invest in scrubbers and carbon 
capture equipment if they cannot depend on the standards and 
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requirements of the law to remain the same. A person would not buy a 
home if he thought that the executive of the bank could change the interest 
rates or the payment schedule to suit his particular ends. Thus, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA weakened the law by 
placing the executive in a position in which he either changed the law or he 
enforced the law under the absurd consequences that resulted from the 
Court’s decision. 
The CAAA is a poorly designed law. For the first twenty years of its 
existence, Congress and a number of presidents were committed to energy 
policy rather than environmental policy. The experts at the EPA have shown 
little imagination or creativity in solving the problems of air pollution. They 
have pushed the use of scrubbers for over forty years. President Reagan 
opposed environmental regulation and President Clinton ignored it. 
President Obama has produced some reductions in the emission of 
greenhouse gases from coal-fired power plants. However, it is uncertain 
how much of these reductions have resulted from his environmental policy 
and how much have resulted from the slow economy and competition from 
natural gas to fuel electric utilities. In over fifty years of global warming 
research, the science does not appear to have convinced politicians or the 
American people that the threat of anthropogenic global warming requires 
an all-out commitment to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired 
power plants. The pervasiveness of the uncertainties in all aspects of global 
89  
warming science and air pollution control does not convince one that current 
scientific knowledge is adequate for the formulation of government policy to 
control the environment. The much vaunted scientific consensus with regard 
man-made global warming and government environmental policy, is not 
convincing. This is not to deny that climate change is real or that outlandish 
amounts of CO2 are being pumped into the atmosphere. However, the 
inadequacies of observational data and the computer models on which we 
base environmental policy may do more harm than good. Computer 
generated climate models have many problems and most of global warming 
science has been based on them since the 1950s. 
Many, if not most, of these models are based on correlations resulting 
from incidents of past climate warming. These correlations are estimated 
from concentrations of different isotopes of oxygen formed in the ocean 
during warming and cooling periods. These are compared to CO2 
concentrations in Arctic and Antarctic ice-core samples. The resulting 
correlations are used as the basis for many computer generated climate 
models. Global warming theory indicates that CO2 concentrations are 
responsible for the rise in global temperatures. However, author Roy 
Spencer writes that, “First, most if not all of the studies of those ice-core 
based relationships between temperature and CO2 suggests that 
temperature changes preceded CO2 changes by at least several hundred 
years. This indicates the possibility that temperature changes caused carbon 
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dioxide changes, rather than the other way around as is the claim of global 
warming.”257 Correlations are not evidence; they do not speak to causality. In 
other words, just because temperatures rise does not mean that it is causing 
a rise CO2 concentration as well. Both could rise as the result of a third 
factor or a combination of other factors. Again, this is not to deny the 
possibility of man-made climate change, but there are valid reasons to be 
skeptical of the cause and the effect of climate change. Although there are 
possible solutions to correct some of the problems associated with the 
CAAA, the possibility and practicality of making such changes is doubtful. If 
the law could be reenacted, it might be constructed in the following way. 
First, the law would be repealed and rewritten. Congress would take 
the responsibility for setting the environmental standards of the new law. 
Hence, any change in the standards or the requirements of the law would be 
corrected by the appropriate legal authority. Congress would also take 
responsibility for the scientific and technological research. It would form 
commissions that represent both the scientific community and industries to 
be regulated. This would provide expert information from a combination of 
the applied knowledge of industry experts and the more theoretical scientific 
knowledge of scientists. These commissions would report their findings 
directly to Congress, and Congress would then use the information to 
establish standards and formulate solutions for pollution control. This would 
depoliticize the science and produce solutions that would be more 
91  
acceptable to the power industry. The political issues would be worked out in 
Congress by the representatives of the nation’s interests. The EPA would 
remain under the Executive branch, but the only duty that it would perform 
would be the enforcement of the environmental standards provided by the 
law. It would not set standards, conduct research, or adjudicate and punish 
violators of the law. The EPA would confine its duties to citing violators and 
providing evidence of wrongdoing to the Justice Department. The EPA 
Administrator would be free to organize the enforcement regime of the 
agency as he or she thinks is most appropriate. This would maintain the 
separation of powers between the Executive and Congress and reduce 
political tensions between these two branches of government. If local 
interests are represented in the legislative process and the sole 
responsibility of the EPA is to enforce the law, states could then focus on 
their local environmental programs and help local interests in meeting the 
environmental standards of the federal law. This would reduce political 
tension between the state and federal governments and between local and 
national interests. Finally, the law would neither encourage nor try to restrict 
judicial intervention. There would be no need for agency-forcing provisions 
or to protect the law from judicial intervention. If the Court intervenes and 
makes a finding that affects the application of the law, Congress has the 
authority and the means to correct it as it sees fit. The subject of 
environmental law is complicated and controversial in many ways. This 
92  
study has barely scratched the surface of the issues involved. However, it is 
an area of study that can provide many insights into the law, governance, 
and science. It can also provide great insight into relationship between these 
areas of study. 
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